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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis investigates whether the success of a regional autonomy movement within a 
nation state belonging to the European Union (EU) is determined by the actions of the national 
government or activities on behalf of the autonomy within the EU. Case studies are made of the 
autonomy movements in the Åland Islands, Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders, and the results are 
compared through a matrix typology. The level of autonomy of a region is determined by its 
“independent fiscal ability,” defined as the region’s ability to raise revenues or to receive 
automatic transfer payments from the national government. The actions of a central government 
affecting the region’s level of autonomy are defined as those that affect the region’s independent 
fiscal ability. Activities within the EU on behalf of a region’s autonomy are defined to include 
the region’s own paradiplomatic activities at the EU as well as actions of EU institutions on 
behalf of that autonomy. These indicators are generalizable and can be applied to all regional 
autonomies in nations belonging to the EU.  It is found that the success of a regional autonomy 
movement is determined by the actions of a national government and not the activities on behalf 
of the region’s autonomy within the EU. The results have implications in the understanding of 
the EU’s three-tiered system of federalism.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A major issue confronting Europe today is the relationship of regions within nations to 
national governments. It has been estimated that throughout Europe, there are 100 movements in 
29 countries that are seeking either greater autonomy within the framework of an existing nation 
state or complete national independence (Campanella). The emergence of the European Union 
(EU) as a true supranational body has given a new option to autonomy movements in promoting 
their cause. As was always the case, they can work for autonomy on the national level by seeking 
to persuade national governments to expand regional governmental powers. A new option 
available to regional autonomy movements is to work within the EU and its institutions to 
promote the cause of their autonomy. As many governmental competences are shifted from the 
national to the European level, and as the EU increasingly gains the stature of a major 
governmental entity in its own right, the question arises whether active participation by regional 
autonomy movements in EU institutions is an effective strategy on their part.  
 This thesis will attempt to answer this question by examining four separate European 
autonomies, those of the Åland Islands (Åland), Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders. As will be 
described in detail below, each of these autonomies presents a separate situation in terms of the 
attitude of the national government toward granting a greater level of regional autonomy and the 
activity within the EU on behalf of that autonomy.  
Based on evidence derived from the comparative experiences of these four regions, the 
question is addressed whether the success of an autonomy movement is dependent on the 
policies of the national government, on activities within the EU, or on both. The thesis begins 
with a literature review that explores the concept of autonomy as it has been developed in 
previous scholarly studies. Additionally, the literature review examines previous literature that 
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distinguishes the EU’s complex, three-tier federal structure with the two-tier federal structure of 
nation states and hypothesizes how this three-tier structure may be supportive of regional 
autonomy movements.  
A theoretical section follows. The first part of this section defines the key terms that are 
essential to the following discussion. Most critically, the thesis develops a measurable test of the 
degree of autonomy of a region that is based on the degree of a region’s budgetary control. This 
test has general application and can be used effectively regardless of the specific characteristics 
of a regional autonomy. A typology is then developed for classifying different autonomy 
movements within the EU in terms of two basic criteria: 1) the support or opposition of the 
national government to greater autonomy for the region; 2) activities within the EU relating to 
the autonomy movement. The four case studies are matched to each element of this typology. 
Each of these cases presents a separate combination of regional activity or inactivity within EU 
institutions, and of activity or inactivity within EU institutions.  
This discussion is followed by an explanation of the methodology used. The purpose of 
the methodology is to reach testable conclusions as to the role of the EU, as it is currently 
structured, in influencing autonomy movements. In furtherance of this purpose, the time frame 
selected covers the approximately decade-long period following the signing of the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009. Source materials are primarily limited to governmental sources, available in English and 
reliable explanations of those sources. The indicators used seek to determine two basic facts for 
each case studied: First, whether the level of autonomy has increased during the time period 
considered; and second, whether there has been activity on behalf of the region’s autonomy 
within the EU.  
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The theoretical section concludes with the presentation of two alternative hypotheses that 
are tested in the remainder of the thesis. Under the first hypothesis, the actions of a nation state 
are determinative for the success of a regional autonomy movement. Under the second 
hypothesis, it is the activity on behalf of the region within the EU that is determinative in this 
regard. 
The four case studies are then presented. For each case, there is an introductory section 
that puts recent regional developments in a longer historical context so as to provide a better 
perspective on the present situation. Detailed evidence is then presented that answers the two 
basic questions of whether the region’s level of autonomy has grown and whether there has been 
activity on behalf of that autonomy within the EU.  
A summary of results considers which of the above two hypotheses is confirmed by the 
evidence presented. It is found that only one of the alternative hypotheses fits the recent 
historical facts presented. Additionally, the summary of results presents ideas on how the present 
study can be extended to encompass additional autonomies as well as future developments 
within the EU.   
As will be examined in detail below, the common thread in all of the cases examined here 
is that the EU leadership still views the EU as a treaty of nations rather than a union of its 
citizens, and for this reason consistently defers on matter of autonomy to the interests of nation 
states. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The present literature review is divided into three parts. It begins with a discussion of the 
meaning of “autonomy” as previous scholars have attempted to define it. This discussion is a 
prerequisite to the entire consideration of regional autonomies in the remainder of the thesis. The 
review then proceeds to literature addressing the EU’s three-tier federal structure and its 
potential importance in fostering autonomy movements. Finally, this section reviews primary EU 
source materials, including provisions of the Treaty of European Union (TEU), statements of EU 
officials and a landmark decision of the European Court of Justice that have bearing on the status 
of autonomous movements under this three-tier federal system, together with scholarly analyses 
of these source materials.  
Concepts of autonomy: Several separate but complementary concepts of political 
autonomy developed by previous authors are considered here.  
Autonomy as governmental power: Harhoff defines autonomy as a transfer of powers 
from a national to a regional government. According to Harhoff, local autonomy “[implies] a 
region’s partial independence from national/central governmental influence” (Harhoff at 31). 
Under such an autonomy scheme, specified areas of governance are transferred to a regional or 
local authority, and other specified powers are reserved by the national government. Some 
powers may be exercised concurrently at the national, regional or local levels. Harhoff asserts 
that the degree of autonomy of a region or locality can be measured by the extent of the powers 
transferred away from the national government. At the high end, autonomy may be a “state-like 
sovereignty” in which almost complete powers are transferred to the autonomous region. On the 
lower end of autonomy, a national government will grant only advisory powers to the regional or 
local governing body. The range of issues that can be addressed in an autonomy arrangement is 
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large. A partial list includes taxation, social welfare, labor market affairs, trade, natural 
resources, transportation, and communications (Harhoff 31). Harhoff speaks in general, 
conceptual terms, and provides no exact way to measure the level of a particular autonomy.  
Measures of autonomy: Accepting Harhoff’s basic definition of autonomy, later authors 
have sought to develop a more systematic method for measuring the degree of a region’s 
autonomy. Hannum, Lapidoth, Suksi, and Ghai distinguish at least four broad levels of 
autonomy: personal (the lowest level which extends only to the individual citizen); functional 
(which covers only a few issues such as the right to education in a particular language); 
administrative (conferring limited rights regarding several issues); and legislative (the highest 
level of autonomy). Legislative autonomy requires a broad spectrum of rights and a local 
legislative body with the power to enact enforceable local laws (Tkacik 372-373). 
Tkacik develops this typology further by developing two separate theoretical frameworks 
intended to provide more sensitive measures of the degree of a region’s autonomy. Under his 
first typology, he divides governmental powers into “tiers.” For purposes of measuring the 
degree of an autonomy, he ranks governmental competences in “tiers.”| Tkacik groups those 
governmental competences he deems most significant in a “Tier One.” Under his analysis, a 
strong autonomy is one in which the local government has control over many of the “Tier One” 
competences that he lists. These Tier One competences include control over local affairs, clear 
boundaries for the autonomous territory, level of independence of the local legislature, power of 
the local executive to enforce local laws, “entrenchment” of the autonomous arrangement (that 
is, the ability of the national government to unilaterally change the terms of the autonomy), 
official use of the local language, judicial power to settle disputes, and the right of a region to 
participate in the affairs of the national government as they relate to regional affairs  (Tkacic 
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383-391). Legislative autonomy requires a region to have control over at least one of these Tier 
One issues (Tkacik 383).1  
Tkacik’s separate typology views autonomy as being present on three separate axes. The 
first axis is the scope or aggregate number of issues that can be controlled by the autonomous 
entity. The second axis is the depth of autonomous control, and the third axis is the degree of 
spatial or geographic separateness of the autonomous area. According to Tkacik, “[a]n autonomy 
that includes a large number of issues (scope), along with a great deal of control held by the 
autonomous region (depth), and existing in a distinct and insular territory would be considered 
more extensive than one which did not” (Tkacik 370).  
 The large number of variables used by Tkacik for measuring the scope of an autonomy, 
together with his use of the two separate typologies, makes a determination of the relative 
autonomy levels of different regions difficult under his theoretical analysis. Tkacick does not 
describe a way to rank the strengths of two autonomies if one of them ranks higher on the first of 
his typologies (analysis of Tier issues) but lower on the second one (axes of autonomy). Even 
using the Tier system alone raises difficulties in ranking autonomies. For example, if two regions 
have control over the same number Tier One issues but these issues are different for each region, 
Tkacik does not provide a method for comparing the relative strengths of their autonomies. 
Likewise, in his “axis” typology, if one region has a higher autonomy score than another on one 
axis but a lower score on another axis, there is no basis for ranking the autonomies of the two 
regions. 
 Autonomy as an “on or off” condition: Unlike the previous authors, Hannum’s concern is 
limited to a condition of what he terms “full autonomy.” By establishing an “on-off” test for 
                                                
1 Tkacick also lists Tier Two, Tier Three, and Tier Four issues. The higher the tier, the less essential is the 
issue for determining the strength of a legislative autonomy (Tkacick 393-401). 
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determining whether full autonomy is reached, he turns it into a measurable characteristic. 
According to Hannum, “full autonomy” requires “territorial integrity…a local legislature with 
constitutional or other deeply entrenched powers” which “was not subject to veto in its areas of 
competence, a locally selected executive and an independent local judiciary” (Tkacik 372). 
Hannum’s test does not allow for the same analysis of degrees of autonomy as the sliding scale 
analyses of Harhoff and Tkacik. His definition of full autonomy is basically an “on” and “off” 
test. Full autonomy is triggered “on” only when his specific test is met. His test is less 
explanatory than those previously described in that it does not evaluate degrees of autonomy that 
fall below the “full” level. As the case studies below will illustrate, however, Hannum’s 
definition is important for helping to understand the point at which populations living within a 
region can be expected to begin to favor complete separation from their nation states. That point 
can come when regional populations feel that despite their wishes, the central state will not allow 
their current, limited autonomy to reach the full autonomy set forth in Hannum’s definition.  
 Although the above concepts of autonomy differ from one another, they are in basic 
agreement as to what factors should be considered in evaluating the level of an autonomy. The 
list of autonomous features developed by Harhoff is consistent with those set forth by Tkacik and 
Hannum. The typology of Tkacik and Hannum’s “on-off’ switch for full autonomy likewise 
highlight features of autonomy consistent with the other definitions2.   
Two-tier and three-tier federalism: In considering the development of regional 
autonomies, it is essential to consider the comparative roles played by different forms of federal 
governmental structures. Central to this analysis as it will be developed in this thesis is the work 
                                                
2 Other authors have developed additional methods for classifying autonomies. Autonomies can be 
distinguished “according to beneficiaries of autonomy, according to the purpose of the autonomy (e.g., conflict 
resolution, protecting a specific identity, transition to independence, whether autonomy was negotiated ‘top-down’ 
or ‘bottom-up.’ ” (Takcik n. 4). None of these methods will be used in the present thesis because they provide no 
way to compare the relative strengths of different autonomies.    
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of Noutcheva et al. In their article, “Europeanization and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and 
Theories,” these authors distinguish between two-tier and three-tier federalism. Two-tier 
federalism involves a governmental relationship between a nation state and its regional parts in 
which specific governmental functions are delegated to each. Three-tier federalism means a 
governmental structure in which there are not only regions and a nation state, but also a supra-
national institution that encompasses both of these. Governmental authority is divided between 
the three levels of governance. The EU is the world’s leading example of a functioning three-tier 
governmental system. 
Noutcheva et al. identify several ways in which a three-tier governmental system can help 
to resolve secessionist conflicts. First, by taking over some governmental competences, the 
supra-national tier can help to resolve conflicts between the first tier (region) and second tier 
(nation state) over their respective roles in governance. Examples of the EU’s assumption of 
competences can be found in agriculture, the environmental and trade policy, where the EU now 
has a dominant role. The presence of the EU as an important element of the government structure 
can also make it easier to resolve constitutional conflicts between the region and the nation state. 
Finally, the EU can help to increase the authority of a region without interfering with the 
integrity of the nation state by giving the region opportunities in EU governance, for example, by 
providing for regional representation in the Council of Ministers or expanding contacts between 
the region and EU institutions (Noutcheva 5-10). 
The second basic way in which the EU can help to resolve regional conflicts is by serving 
as a mediator between the region and central state. Noutcheva et al. argue that “a third level of 
governance may create new incentives and expectations in a settlement process, and may even 
lead to a redefinition of the interests and identities of the parties involved in a secessionist 
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conflict. This is particularly the case when the federated entities can be integrated into the third 
level of governance.”   
Although Noutcheva et al. address separatist movements, their analysis is equally 
applicable to regional autonomy movements seeking increased autonomy short of full national 
separation. In fact, because the EU has been supportive of limited regional autonomies while it 
has opposed separation movements, it can be expected that EU institutions will be more useful in 
resolving efforts by regions to gain greater autonomy short of independence. The analysis of 
Noutcheva et al. has received support from Connolly, who has pointed out the many specific 
ways in which the EU structure can facilitate the resolution of regional disputes. These include 
the following: 
• Subsidiarity principle: Article 5 of the Treaty on EU (TEU) establishes a preference for 
decision-making at the regional or local level if this is practicable. Regions can argue the 
subsidiarity principle in support of greater control over their own affairs.   
• Regional representation: Regions are represented in the EU in the Committee of Regions 
(CoR). The 2009 Lisbon Treaty requires consultation by the European Commission, 
Council, and Parliament with the CoR on matters concerning local or regional 
government. Furthermore, the CoR can challenge EU laws before the European Court of 
Justice on the basis that they violate the subsidiarity principle. In this way, regions can 
use the EU’s constitutional structure to press for greater regional control. 
• Paradiplomacy: European separatist parties in Catalonia and Scotland have actively 
lobbied EU institutions and other national governments on behalf of regional separation 
and have established “informational offices” in Brussels.  
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• EU “rights regime”: The rights regime ensures cultural and linguistic protections for 
minority groups within nations.   
• Growth of regional parties: The various European regional parties supporting increased 
autonomy or national separation are grouped together in the European Parliament in 
coalition with the Greens as the Greens-European Free Alliance. This grouping gives 
them a parliamentary influence and coordination (Miadownick and Cartrite). 
• Representation on Council of Ministers: Regional representation may extend even to 
direct Council of Ministers representation on issues affecting the region, as will be 
discussed below in the case of Flanders  
Bourne, however, has argued that that the forces working against separatism with the EU 
are outweighed by the absence of “support from sufficiently authoritative European actors.” She 
has linked this absence of support for regional separatist movements to the EU’s continued use 
of a “just cause” rather than “democratic choice” test for secession. A question to be explored 
empirically is whether the absence of “support from sufficiently authoritative European actors” 
extends also to a lack of meaningful EU support for increased regional autonomies short of 
independence. The formal EU structures supporting regional governments have been listed 
above, but this does not answer the question of whether these structures can actually be used 
effectively by regional governments seeking to expand their autonomous powers within a nation 
state. 
EU source materials and their scholarly interpretation: Possessing the most fully 
developed three-tier federal structure in the world, the EU provides a laboratory for determining 
whether a three-tier federal structure can ease the transition between autonomy within a nation 
state and full national separation of the autonomous region. In fact, the EU has taken contrasting 
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positions towards regional autonomy short of independence on the one hand, and full national 
separation on the other hand. The EU has supported the first while opposing the second. The 
support of the EU towards autonomous arrangements extends even to regions with very high 
levels of autonomy approaching, but not quite reaching, national independence. (Flanders is an 
example of such a region, as will be illustrated below).  
The EU has adopted a “just cause” for national separation (Bourne). This test is much 
more difficult to meet than the alternative “democratic choice” test which can be met simply by a 
majority vote by the inhabitants of a region in a referendum on separation. In contrast, the “just 
cause” test can only be met in two situations: 1) cases of colonialism (which do not generally 
apply to European countries); or 2) where there is a denial of the “core values democracy and 
rule of law” (Dayton). In other words, for the EU to accept a national separation within a 
member state, it must conclude that the nation state is acting against the affected region in a 
fashion that is both undemocratic and violates the rule of law. 
 The extreme difficulty in meeting the “just cause” test is reflected in the statements made 
by two European Commission presidents on the requirements for admission to the EU of a 
breakaway region claiming national independence. In response to a question from a Member of 
the European Parliament from Wales, Commission President Romano Prodi said in 2004 that 
such a state would have to apply to the EU under the accession procedures of Article 49 of the 
Treaty on EU (TEU). As explained by Prodi: 
An application of this type requires, if the application is accepted by 
the Council acting unanimously, a negotiation on an agreement 
between the Applicant State and the Member States on the 
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conditions of admission and the adjustments to the treaties which 
such admission entails. The Admission is subject to ratification by  
all Member States and the Applicant State (Kenealy and McLennan 
593).  
A letter expressing the same position was issued by then Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso in 2012, in response to Lord Tugendhat, a member of the United Kingdom’s 
House of Lords. This correspondence was issued in response to an inquiry by the Economic 
Affairs Committee of the House of Lords into “The Economic Implications for the United 
Kingdom of Scottish Independence.” President Barroso first stated that every case of separation 
would have to be decided on its individual facts:  
…the European Commission has noted that scenarios such as the 
separation of one part of a Member State or the creation of a new 
state would not be neutral as regards the EU Treaties. The European 
Commission would express its opinion on the legal consequences the 
legal consequences under EU law upon request from a Member State 
detailing a precise scenario.”   
     Barroso then expressed the Commission’s general position that a region separating from its 
member state would be expelled from the EU: 
“The EU is founded on the Treaties which apply only to the 
Member States who have agreed and ratified them. If part of the 
territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that state 
because it were to become a new independent state, the Treaties 
would no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a new 
13 
 
independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a 
third country with respect to the EU and the Treaties would no 
longer apply on its territory” (“Scotland and the EU: Barroso’s 
reply to Lord Tugendhat”).  
In their statements, Prodi and Barroso made no distinction between the entry into the EU 
of a region that has seceded in conformity with the laws of the state to which it currently 
belonged (for example, following a successful independence referendum approved by the central 
state), and a region which is currently attempting to break away in defiance of an EU member 
state’s national laws. As will be described below, Scotland and Catalonia are potential examples 
of these two types of regions.   
Both of these European Commission presidents rejected the entry of a breakaway state 
into the EU under Article 48 TEU. Article 48 contains the so-called “ordinary revision 
procedure” that involves the amendment of existing treaties with ratification by all EU states. 
Admission of a new state to the EU under Article 48 can be expected to be both quicker and 
more likely to achieve success than admission under the alternative Article 49 procedure that 
requires the full accession process applicable to an entirely new EU member state (Kenealy and 
MacLennan at 601).  
The EU’s general opposition to national separation by regions within EU member states 
is based on the language of the Treaty on EU (TEU) as amended by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. 
Article 1 TEU states that the “High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European 
Union.” Article 4 (2) TEU requires the EU “to respect the [member countries]…essential state 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State[.]” Article 52 TEU has been 
interpreted to mean that the EU has “derivative” rather than “original” sovereignty, meaning that 
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decisions as to national borders rest entirely with the member states (Keating). These three 
provisions, taken together, provide support for the argument that the EU is a treaty of existing 
nation states, and that the EU therefore has no authority to accept the entry of new states without 
the unanimous consent of EU members.   
However, there are other provisions of the TEU can be interpreted to support of the right 
of regions to separate from their central states. Article 2 TEU sets forth the EU’s “core values of 
democracy and rule of law.” Regional separatists have cited this article in arguing that a 
“democratic choice” test rather than a “just cause” test should be used by the EU with regard to 
separatist movements (Dayton 7).  
Additionally, Article 20 TEU states that “[c]itizenship of the EU is established” and that 
“[e]very person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.” 
Article 20 lists EU citizenship rights as including the right to free movement among member 
states, to vote and run for office in any of the EU states, to protection of the diplomatic and 
consular authorities of any member state, and to petition the European Parliament and apply to 
the European ombudsman. Kenealy & MacLennan have written that: “[r]ecent jurisprudence of 
the ECJ has brought into question the derivative nature of EU citizenship. It is clear…that the 
Court no longer regards EU citizenship as being subordinate to Member State citizenship. If 
anything, the Court takes quite the opposite view” (Kenealy & MacLennan 606).3  
                                                
3 In the Van Gend & Loos case, the European Court of Justice held that the European Economic 
Community:  
“[C]onstitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore 
not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon 
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only 
where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations 
which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as 
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If EU citizenship is considered equal to, or even more important, than member state 
citizenship, then it cannot be taken away by a change in national borders. A strong argument can 
be made that the citizens of a region which has separated from a member state have the right to 
retain their individual EU citizenship even after the separation has taken place and the new state 
no longer belongs to the EU. A very complicated situation would then arise in which the territory 
of the separating region would be outside the EU, but its citizens still would have EU citizenship 
rights. How the EU could ensure citizenship rights outside the borders of its member countries is 
not at all clear, as the question of the EU citizenship rights of individuals in a separating region 
has not yet been decided.  
The territories of these breakaway regions will have already formed part of the EU, and 
their residents will have already acquired EU citizenship. Thus, “their situation of 
…independence [is]…qualitatively different from accession conventionally understood” 
(Kenealy and MacLennan 601).  
What this means to national separation movements from a practical viewpoint is that the 
previously expressed positions of EU officials toward breakaway regions are not fixed and 
unchangeable but instead have a normative character. As the concept of EU citizenship becomes 
increasingly important, the attitudes of EU officials toward national separations may change. 
Instead of turning their backs on separation efforts, they may become more willing to work with 
separatist regions to try to ease their way back into the EU through the use of the Article 48 
procedure and cooperative efforts between the regions and EU governmental bodies. Whether 
such a change in attitude is actually occurring can only be determined by looking empirically at 
                                                                                                                                                       
upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community” (Van 
Gend & Loos at 11). 	
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specific cases of European separatist movements and their attempts to influence EU bodies 
toward their way of interpreting applicable TEU provisions. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
 This section sets forth definitions of “autonomy,” “activities within the EU” and 
“paradiplomacy” as they are to be used in the remainder of this thesis. These definitions provide 
the theoretical underpinning for the research questions posed and the interpretation of the 
evidence collected.   
 Autonomy:  
The thesis will follow Hannum’s basic conception of autonomy in a modified form. 
Hannum establishes a threshold, measurable level at which autonomy can be considered to have 
turned “on.” Until a region has reached this threshold level, it cannot be considered to be a true 
autonomy. The present thesis takes a differing approach by including within the universe of 
autonomies all regions that have any level of governmental separation from their nation state. 
The “on-off” test that will be used here is whether a particular autonomy can be said to have 
increased from its previous state. To answer this inquiry, it is necessary to define the threshold 
point at which the autonomy has transitioned to a new level.  
Instead of Hannum’s “full autonomy,” this thesis will term this threshold level as “real 
autonomy.”4 The distinguishing characteristic of this real autonomy is “independent fiscal 
ability,” defined as the budgetary capacity of a regional government to implement a 
governmental competence independently from assistance by the nation state.5 An independent 
fiscal ability must be distinguished from a governmental competence. A competence gives a 
government substantive legal authority to legislate and regulate in a particular area of 
governance but it does not provide the financial resources for it to do so. Independent fiscal 
ability provides the government with financial resources, separate from those under the control 
                                                
4 For the rest of this thesis, the terms “real autonomy” and “autonomy” will be used interchangeably. 
5 The term “independent fiscal ability” will also be abbreviated below as “fiscal ability.” 
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of the national government, to actually implement a competence. Without independent fiscal 
ability, a governmental competence exists only on thesis because its exercise requires the 
budgetary consent of a higher level of government.  
Independent fiscal ability can be attained in three ways: 1) through independent taxing 
authority; 2) through automatic transfer payments from the central government which the central 
government does not have authority to veto; or 3) through a combination of “1” and “2”.  
 “Real autonomy”, as defined here, has a lower threshold than the “full autonomy” of 
Hannum. Hannum’s “on-off” switch requires complete, independent legislative control of all 
governmental functions by a regional parliament. The “on-off” switch proposed here for real 
autonomy here does not have to apply to the full range of governmental actions. It only requires 
that a region have budgetary powers in a single area of governance. The purpose of this lower 
threshold is to define autonomy as including situations where a region has actual power to 
finance one or more of its operations independently, even if that power falls short of complete 
control over its finances.    
 There is another important difference between Hannum’s “full autonomy” and the “real 
autonomy” proposed here. Hannum’s “full autonomy” can only operate at one fixed level with 
an independent legislature and judiciary. In contrast, there can be greater and lesser degrees of 
“real autonomy” once it is triggered. The amount of “real autonomy” possessed by a region can 
go up or down as the region gains or loses budgetary and taxing powers in different areas of 
governance, and this increase or decrease can be measured in terms of the number of areas of 
governance in which the region has independent fiscal ability, as well as in terms of the degree of 
fiscal ability within each area of governance (for example, with regard to education expenditures, 
a region’s real autonomy would increase if it became able to independently finance one-half 
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instead of one-quarter of expenditures). This allows for a more sensitive determination of 
changes in the level of a regional autonomy.    
 This budgetary test of real autonomy proposed here is consistent with the analyses of 
Harhoff, Tkacik, and Hannum. Harhoff’s concept of transfer of powers as a test of autonomy 
depends on the ability of a region to actually implement these powers on an independent basis, 
and that in turn requires independent budgetary authority by the region. Under Tkacik’s “Tier” 
test, a region can only be considered to exercise control over a Tier issue if it has ability to tax 
and appropriate funds for the issue. Likewise, under Tkacik’s “three-axis” analysis, the number 
of issues controlled by an autonomous region, and the depth of this control all depend on the 
region’s fiscal ability.6 Finally, Hannum’s “on” switch for full autonomy is consistent with the 
definition proposed here, as a region that reaches Hannum’s “full autonomy” would gain more 
control over its taxing and spending powers, and so would also experience an increase in its “real 
autonomy.”  
Two closely related concepts frequently arise in discussions of autonomy, namely, 
“devolution” and “national separation.” The concept of autonomy developed above can be 
applied to both of these concepts. “Devolution” has been defined as a transfer of powers from 
national governments to sub-state governments (MacKinnon 47). Typically, devolution to a 
particular region does not take place all at once but is “a process, not an event” (MacKinnon 49). 
The numbers and types of powers that are transferred to a sub-state government can vary widely. 
Devolution can involve the transfer of only a single governmental competence such as housing 
(Silvius). Alternatively, it can involve the transfer of diverse competences in many areas of 
governance. There are as many varieties of devolution that can take place as there are possible 
                                                
6 Tkacik’s axis of geographical separateness is not, however, covered by the definition of “real autonomy” 
proposed here. 
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varieties of autonomy. The reason for this is that the devolution of power to a region and the 
region’s corresponding increase in real autonomy, are mirror images of one another. If 
devolution is occurring, autonomy is increasing to exactly the same extent. The definition of real 
autonomy used above can therefore be used to test whether and to what extent devolution is 
occurring.  
“National separation” can be viewed as the most extensive possible form of real 
autonomy. A region that has achieved national separation has become a newly independent state. 
Real autonomy short of independence and national separation exist on a continuum. A region can 
gain such a high level of autonomy that it closely approaches independence. Through a further 
increase in autonomy it can then cross the threshold to complete national separation. Because 
they differ only in degree and can be measured in the same way, both autonomy short of 
independence and national separation can be analyzed using the same research methodology. 
Within each region considered in the case studies below, there are proponents of increasing the 
autonomy to the level of national separation. 
“Activities within the EU”:  
This phrase will be deemed to encompass both the actions of a region to promote its 
autonomy within the EU (paradiplomacy as defined below) and the actions taken by EU 
institutions themselves in response to these regional activities. These two types of activities must 
be considered together because the importance of the EU with respect to autonomy movements is 
not confined to the concrete actions taken by EU bodies. Besides the specific actions it takes on 
behalf of a regional autonomy, the EU may have significance to an autonomy movement just by 
the space it provides as a transnational body to which extensive competences have been 
transferred by its member nation states. It may be hypothesized that regional autonomy 
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movements can gain confidence and strength in relation to their national governments because 
both the region and the national government have the perception that the region has the power to 
go around the national government and obtain EU help. It will be up to the region to build this 
perception through its interactions with EU institutions.  
As diagrammed in the typology section below, a region’s “activities within the EU” is 
one of the two independent variables used in this thesis, the other being the actions of the 
national government toward the region.    
Paradiplomacy:  
This is a term coined to describe the diplomatic activities of sub-national governments. A 
clear definition of this term is important here because paradiplomacy is one of the two 
components of a region’s activities within the EU as defined above. Paradiplomacy is the method 
by which a region seeks to influence EU institutions. Grydehøj has defined “paradiplomacy” as 
“a political entity’s extra-jurisdictional activating targeting foreign political entities.” Wolf 
provides a longer definition, characterizing “paradiplomacy” as “the foreign policy capacity of 
substate entities: their participation, independent of their metropolitan state, in the international 
arena in pursuit of their own specific international interests.” Under either of these definitions, 
paradiplomacy has two components. First, it includes interactions between representatives of the 
regional government and the representatives of other nations, supra-national institutions such as 
the EU, or international organizations such as the United Nations. Within the EU, these 
interactions can include representation of the regional government in EU bodies, as is the case 
with Flanders. Second, the above definitions of paradiplomacy also cover less formal lobbying 
and publicity efforts by a region that aim to influence the policies of other governmental entities. 
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The nature of paradiplomacy in an EU context will be further explored in the methodology 
section below. 
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CHAPTER 4: TYPOLOGY 
The goal in developing the typology used in this thesis has been to select key variables 
that are critical in determining the success or failure of regional movements for greater autonomy 
within EU states. The variables selected have been the position of the national government 
towards greater autonomy for a region, and the activities within the EU on behalf of such greater 
autonomy. As developed in this thesis, these variables have a “yes or no” and “on or off”” 
character because at any given time, a national government either supports greater autonomy or 
it does not, and a region either is making use of EU institutions to promote its autonomy or it is 
not. A granting of increased autonomy by a nation state to a region need not occur across all 
areas of governance. As will be explained in detail in the methodology section below, for 
purposes of the present study an increase in autonomy will be deemed to occur if a region 
increases the level of its autonomy in even a single area of governance as long as there are no 
reductions in other areas of governance. There can be changes over time in the positions of a 
national government with respect to increases in a regional autonomy as well as in activities 
within the EU on behalf of that autonomy. For this reason, it is necessary, in making a 
determination whether a regional autonomy has increased, to confine the study to a clearly 
demarcated time frame.  
With this approach in mind, the case studies examined in this thesis are divided into four 
categories. The first category in the typology is central government opposition to greater 
autonomy and lack of activity within EU institutions on behalf of greater autonomy. For this 
category, the case selected is Åland. At least since the date of the Lisbon Treaty in December 
2009, Finland has been unwilling to expand Åland’s real autonomy beyond the parameters of the 
1921 League of Nations treaty that originally established Åland as an autonomous region of the 
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country. Despite an active Åland independence movement, the regional government of Åland has 
not requested the EU’s help in expanding the scope of its long-standing autonomy arrangement 
with the national Finnish state and EU institutions have taken no action on this topic.     
The second category in the typology is opposition to greater real autonomy by the 
national government coupled with EU activities seeking to promote these autonomy goals. The 
case selected here is Catalonia. The regional parliament of Catalonia, having been denied greater 
real autonomy by the central Spanish state, has lobbied extensively within the EU for a full 
national separation from Spain, establishing its own paradiplomatic corps to do so. 
The third category is central government support for greater autonomy and inactivity 
within EU institutions on behalf of the autonomy). Here the selected case is Scotland. Through a 
series of devolution acts, the parliament of the United Kingdom has granted progressively greater 
autonomy for Scotland that includes even a possible national separation accomplished through a 
referendum consented to by the nation state. Scotland, however, despite its strongly European 
orientation, has not sought the help of the EU to assist in this ongoing devolution process and EU 
institutions have taken no actions in this regard.   
Finally, the fourth category in the typology is support by a central national government 
accepts greater real autonomy and EU activity to promote this increase in autonomy. The region 
selected to represent this category is Flanders. Flanders, as will be described below in its case 
study, has progressively increased the extent of its autonomy with the full support of the federal 
Belgian government while its governmental representatives work within EU institutions to 
promote its regional goals.  
A careful selection of cases was essential to fully and accurately examine the respective 
importance of nation states and the EU in determining the success of an autonomy movement. In 
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light of the importance of this selection process, several criteria were developed. First, the region 
needed to have a politically active regional autonomy movement within the entire time frame of 
the study. Second, the actions of the central government within this time frame needed to show 
whether it supported or opposed greater autonomy for the region. Third, the actions of the 
regional government within the time frame needed to show whether or not it had sought the 
assistance of the EU in achieving regional autonomy.    
This process of case selection is represented in the following table: 
Table 1.  Actions of regional and national governments in relation to regional 
autonomy efforts—greater autonomy achieved? 
 EU activity takes place on 
behalf of greater regional 
autonomy (paradiplomatic 
activity by region or action 
by EU institutions) 
EU activity does not take 
place on behalf of greater 
regional autonomy. 
National government 
supports greater regional 
autonomy.  
Hypothesized case: Flanders Hypothesized case: Scotland 
National government does 
not support greater regional 
autonomy. 
Hypothesized case: 
Catalonia 
Hypothesized case: Åland 
 
This matrix typology allows an examination of all of the possible combinations of 
possibilities involving:  
1) Support or opposition to regional devolution by a national government in 
relation to a region; and 
2)  Activity or lack of activity by a regional government to obtain support for its 
autonomy efforts within EU institutions.  
The method of qualitative analysis used in this analysis provides a uniquely useful 
method of uncovering the primary factors determining the success of regional political 
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movements seeking greater autonomy from their nation states within the EU. The strength of the 
qualitative method selected here lies in its strength of detail over time. The case studies presented 
here set forth the historical arc of four separate autonomy movements within widely differing 
nations. A purely historical recounting of these separate movements would not provide a 
rigorous basis for comparison. A comparative approach based purely on current evidence would 
not shed sufficient light on the historical evolution of each autonomy movement. But by basing 
its comparative approach upon observed historical events, a collection of related evidence can be 
derived that give a tentative general answer to the question of whether the actions of nation states 
or those of the EU are more important essential in establishing the success or failure of the 
efforts of a European region to achieve greater autonomy.  
The evidence considered here will be used to answer three “yes” or “no” questions for 
each region considered: First, does the national government support greater regional autonomy 
or not? Second, is there activity within EU institutions aimed to promote this increased regional 
autonomy? Third, has the region achieved greater autonomy or not? The matrix structure 
structures the responses in a manner that will provide an answer to these questions.   
An objection to the above typology is that it will not provide useful information because 
a national government always must agree to expansions of the autonomy of one of its regions. 
The answer to this objection is that if it operated effectively as a three-tier federal system, the EU 
would have the capacity to influence the national government into changing its position of 
opposition to more autonomy to a position of support. If the national government changed its 
position on the conferring of greater autonomy only in response to EU intervention on behalf of 
the region, there should be confirming documentary evidence contained within governmental 
materials from both the national government and the EU. On the matrix above, the national 
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government’s position would be recorded as opposition to greater autonomy (its position before 
EU intervention).    
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
Components:  
There are three key components of the methodology used here, namely, the time frame 
selected, the indicators used, and the source materials chosen. The evidence used to reach the 
conclusions of this study are limited by how these three items are selected. The time frame is the 
historical period over which evidence for the study is collected. The source materials are those 
types of documents items whose contents are deemed admissible as evidence. Finally, the 
indicators are those elements of evidence that will be reviewed to arrive at a conclusion whether 
the central hypothesis presented is confirmed or denied.  
Time frame: The time frame selected for the present thesis begins on December 1, 2009, 
the date the Lisbon treaty became effective, and extends to the end of calendar year 2018. The 
reason for the selection of this beginning date is that the Lisbon Treaty established the current 
structure of EU institutions. By significantly revising the structure of EU governance, the Lisbon 
Treaty expanded the range of opportunities of regional governments to seek the assistance of EU 
institutions in their efforts for greater autonomy.  
To obtain an accurate picture of the EU’s ability to affect the course of autonomy 
movements, it is essential to look at these EU institutions in the form that they exist today. 
Evidence obtained from earlier stages in the EU’s evolution when the potential influence of the 
regions on EU institutions and policies were much smaller could lead to incorrectly minimizing 
the ability of the EU to promote greater regional autonomy. That is the justification for 
considering only evidence from the time of the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty when the EU 
took its current form.     
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One of the most significant changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty is this treaty’s 
strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament (EP), so that it is on an equal footing 
with the Council of the EU (European Parliament). Under this bicameral system, it became a 
more valuable activity for regions to lobby their position on behalf of greater autonomy within 
the EP and its committees. The EP is more accessible to regional governments than is either the 
European Commission or Council of Ministers. There are two basic reasons for this. First, there 
are several hundred members of the EP compared to the 28 members of both the Council of the 
EU and the European Commission. The larger number of EP members makes it much easier for 
regional representatives to interact with at least some of them on a personal level. The rank-and-
file MEPs occupy lower governmental positions than the members of the Council of the EU and 
European Commission who hold high governmental positions within their home countries. Being 
closer to the people, rank-and-file MEPs can be expected to be more easily accessible to regional 
lobbyists. Additionally, some of the MEPs will represent national governments that include the 
regions themselves. Supporters of greater regional autonomy can work to elect MEPs from their 
home countries who share their regional autonomy goals. If elected, these MEPs can then 
advance their autonomy agenda through conversations and lobbying with other MEPs. These 
MEPs can also work to draft and sponsor parliamentary initiatives promoting the cause of 
regional autonomy (for example, resolutions calling upon the EU to act as a mediator in disputed 
issues between the region and its central government).       
Although the evidence used to test this thesis’s hypothesis will be limited to events 
beginning in December 2009, a full discussion of each region for the purposes of this thesis will 
also require background summaries of key earlier events within the selected regions to place 
more recent developments into context and making them understandable. The actions of the 
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United Kingdom in devolving more power to Scotland since 2009, for example, can only be fully 
understood by considering the full process of devolution that began with the Scotland Act of 
1998, and so it is appropriate to include this earlier act as background although it will not be used 
as a evidence point. Likewise, recent events in Åland can only be understood by taking into 
account the 1921 League of Nations agreement that created that region’s autonomy, events in 
Catalonia need to reference the entire history of disputes between that province and the Spanish 
state, and events in Flanders should take into account the different stages of that region’s 
increasingly large powers of self-government. A strength of qualitative studies is that they can 
make use of information other than the evidence collected to place their results into a bigger 
picture and suggest avenues for future research that would not be evident if narrower sets of 
evidence were used.7      
Source materials: The information relied upon here is limited to governmental materials 
available in English and reliable secondary summations in English that directly help to answer 
the questions posed in the typology matrix. All sources will be used purely for the factual 
information contained within them. Generalizations of evidence contained in the sources will not 
be used. A generalization will be considered to be any statement that describes evidence without 
presenting the evidence itself. For example, a statement that “Scotland has attained an increased 
amount of independent control over its budget” will not be included as source material because it 
comments on other evidence regarding Scotland’s budget without actually presenting any 
additional evidence. Subjective interpretations of evidence and editorializing also will not be 
relied upon. These will be deemed to include any statement that goes beyond the actual evidence 
presented. For example, a statement that the Spanish government is opposed to greater autonomy 
                                                
7 An example of how more distant history can put recent events in context is found in the case study on Åland, 
where it is shown that the attitude of the Finnish government towards granting more autonomy changed after 1991 
from one of support to one of opposition. 
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for Catalonia because of its philosophical belief in a unitary state would be rejected for being 
subjective and editorializing, as it does not have a basis in the evidence provided as to the 
Spanish government’s actual activities regarding Catalonian autonomy. 
The following primary sources will be used if available: enacted and proposed laws in the 
national parliament; decisions of a national supreme court; executive orders and actions of the 
highest executive authority of the national government, and material in official government 
publications.  
To determine whether a national government has granted greater fiscal ability to a region 
in any area of competence, the primary materials to be considered will be laws and official 
publications that indicate the region’s ability to raise taxes or receive automatic transfer 
payments from the national government to finance the competence. These may be supplemented 
by reliable secondary sources providing analyses of a region’s fiscal ability. 
To determine whether a region is working within EU institutions to advance its 
autonomy, this thesis will consider documents providing evidence of the region’s paradiplomatic 
efforts to influence EU institutions or indicating the lack of such efforts. These documents 
consist of publications issued by the regional government or its affiliates,8 the national 
government or the EU, including copies of resolutions and summaries of the agency proceedings 
and addresses to EU bodies. Reliable summaries of regional activities within the EU from non-
governmental sources will also be used to the extent the information they provide is purely 
factual.  
                                                
8 Documents from private affiliates will be used where a region’s paradiplomatic efforts are conducted as part of a 
public-private partnership, as has occurred with Catalonia and Scotland.  
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To determine the actions of EU institutions with respect to increases in a region’s 
autonomy, the documents to be relied on are official resolutions, enactments or other 
documentation of EU bodies, and the statements of EU officials regarding the autonomy.   
All of the above sources are used only to the extent that they provide objective 
information relating to fiscal matters and specific governmental and paradiplomatic actions by a 
region or a nation state. It is presumed that for this purpose, governmentally supplied evidence 
and the actions of governments and governmental officials in the spheres of legislation, agency 
actions, judicial rulings and issuance of statements and documents are considered to be the most 
reliable. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the reliability of fiscal information 
provided by EU member nations is enhanced by the fact that it is subject to review and 
evaluation by the European Commission (Commission). EU Regulation 473/2013, adopted in 
2013, “[requires] the monitoring of national numerical fiscal rules by independent institutions 
and the independent production or endorsement of macroeconomic forecasts” (“European 
Semester Thematic Factsheet National Fiscal Governance” 2). The  Commission regularly 
reports to the EP and the Council on the reliability of the fiscal data reported by the member EU 
states (“Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the quality 
of fiscal data reported by Member States in 2016” 3). This reporting process serves as a cross-
check on the reliability of the fiscal information reported by EU governments and thereby adds 
to confidence in the reliability of the fiscal information.  
Even before it acquired auditing powers in 2013, the Commission concluded in 2010that 
“EU fiscal data were generally of high quality and Greece represented a one-off problem.” In 
accord with the Commission’s conclusion, the president of the European Central Bank stated that 
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“while the government finance statistics of the overwhelming majority of the member states is 
reliable, this does not yet apply to all of them” (Castro et al. 5).  
The nation-states under consideration in the present thesis all have high standards of 
fiscal reporting. With respect to Finland, the International Monetary Fund reports that “[f]iscal 
reporting in Finland is transparent and meets good or advanced practice in all areas” (Hansen et 
al. 7). A peer review study of the national statistical institute of Spain concluded that “the 
statistics produced and disseminated are said to be objective and impartial, of high quality and 
reliability” (Snorrason et al. 12). The United Kingdom government’s web service Data.Gov.UK 
has been cited as “a leading example of governments’ provision of open data” that includes a 
wide variety of fiscal information (Granickas 6.1.2). Recent fiscal information presented by the 
government of Scotland can also be expected to be objective and accurate, as in April 2017 
Scotland established the Scottish Fiscal Commission as  “the independent fiscal institution for 
Scotland” (Scottish Fiscal Commission 3). As to Belgium, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) concluded that “the basic government finance processes are supported by a sound 
institutional and legal framework….[f]iscal information is provided through regular publications 
and extensive use of the internet”9 (Deppler and Ter-Minassian 1).  
Non-fiscal evidence that includes enacted legislation and administrative rules, official 
policies and judicial decisions can be safely relied upon as long as they come from an official 
source.10 These types of documents stand on their own as records of government action. The 
only way in which the reliability of these documents could reasonably be doubted is if the 
integrity of the national government itself in recording its activities came into question. The high 
                                                
9 The IMF also stated, however, that “[t]here is room to improve the quality and openness of budget processes”  
(Deppler and Ter-Minassian 1).  10	This	conclusion	of	credibility	excludes	the	possibility	of	data	tampering,	which	is	always	a	possibility	when	electronic	records	are	considered.	
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standards of the four national governments considered in this thesis with respect to fiscal 
reporting gives confidence that their policies of information accuracy and transparency apply to 
non-fiscal information as well.     
Records of activity within the EU on behalf of a regional autonomy can be of four basic 
types, the credibility of each must be considered separately. These are: 1) statements of top EU 
officials concerning a regional autonomy; 2) reports by EU bodies on any official activities 
(legislative, administrative, judicial or policy-making) in relation to the autonomy; 2) reports by 
regions as to their activities in an official capacity within the EU;11and 4) summaries of regional 
paradiplomatic activities. These types of information have different degrees of reliability. 
Assuming the integrity of EU-generated records, the statements of EU officials regarding a 
particular autonomy can be relied upon for their contents provided they have been memorialized 
within official correspondence or official press releases of EU bodies. Likewise, EU 
transcriptions and summaries of official EU actions are entitled to a high degree of credibility. 
The official actions of regions within the EU on behalf of their autonomy can be given the same 
dgree of credibility, as these will also appear in official EU documentation.12  
The credibility of reporting by regions as to their unofficial paradiplomatic activities are 
not as individually credible, as there are no checks on their accuracy and they can be 
misrepresented either by regional representatives themselves or by those reporting on them. The 
key check on credibility here is the consistency of multiple paradiplomatic actions on the part of 
the region under consideration that establish a pattern of activity. For example (as will be 
described below), the government of Catalonia has undertaken a multifaceted paradiplomatic 
                                                
11 For example, the reports by the government of Flanders regarding its appointments to the European Council for 
delegated competences, as will be described in the Flanders case study below. 12	“The EU has pioneered the use of electronic media in providing information and many official 
documents are now available online through the EU web server, Europa, and its legal service Eur-Lex, 
both of which provide information in all official EU languages” (Overy)	
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campaign within the EU over several years to press the cause of Catalonia’s national separation 
from Spain. Considered together, these paradiplomatic activities paint a convincing portrait of 
action by the Catalonian government to garner the EU’s support for an increased autonomy that 
crosses the threshold of national separation.  
The paradiplomatic activity of any region can involve a hybrid of actions that include 
lobbying of individual EU officials, statements by regional representatives before EU bodies, 
informal receptions attended by EU officials, regional position papers and publicity sheets 
distributed within the EU, and political advertising in different forms of media. Conclusions can 
only be drawn as to a region’s paradiplomatic activity by establishing a composite picture of a 
region’s actions, or lack of actions, in these areas considered as a whole. A definitive conclusion 
can be reached that a region has sought to promote its autonomy through paradiplomatic action 
when, based on all of the evidence presented, it can be shown that the region has pursued a 
pattern of working for this goal through multiple actions directed to the same underlying 
purpose. A single instance, or even a few instances of paradiplomatic activity within the EU on 
behalf of a region’s autonomy that are insufficient to show a consistent pattern, will not be 
sufficient to cross this high evidentiary threshold.  
Every effort has been made in this thesis to rely on the evidence provided by primary 
government sources. Where the evidence that could be compiled from these primary sources has 
been deemed insufficient, however, secondary sources deemed reliable have been used.13 
Secondary information from scholarly sources has been preferred. The test for the use of 
secondarily-derived information is whether it can be cross-checked against information expected 
to be contained in the primary documents cited in the secondary source. The application of this 
                                                13	A	practical	problem	faced	by	the	author	in	the	use	of	primary	sources	is	her	lack	of	fluency	in	Finnish,	Swedish,	Spanish,	Catalan	or	Dutch—languages	in	which	many	of	the	primary	sources	regarding	three	of	the	regions	under	consideration	are	written.				
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requirement ensures that any incorrectly presented secondary evidence can be tested and, if 
necessary, falsified by later research. The one exception to this falsifiability standard lies with 
regional paradiplomatic activities, where the activities of regional lobbyists can involve activities 
that cannot be confirmed in official transcripts or summaries. Given the lower level of credibility 
of any reported single paradiplomatic effort, falsifiability can occur here if contrary evidence is 
presented showing that the region’s paradiplomatic activities have consistently differed from 
those reported in this thesis.  
Selected in the manner described above, the evidence used in this thesis can be expected 
to yield accurate conclusions as to the proper placement of each studied region on the typological 
matrix.    
In the specific instance of Catalonia where events have continued to unfold at a rapid 
pace, journalistic reports of recent events during 2017 and 2018 are cited. These reports add 
context to the actions of the Spanish and Catalonian governments. As with the other regions 
studied here, all conclusions as to changes in the scope of Catalonia’s autonomy and actions of 
the national and regional government are based on official sources and reliable explanations of 
those sources.    
For the historical summaries of each region covering the period before the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty, a broader range of reliable secondary sources is used. The reason for this is that these 
longer-term historical reviews are not being used as evidence but rather to place the results 
within a broader context that may help to indicate its full significance and suggest directions for 
future research. For this purpose, reliable secondary historical materials sources are an 
acceptable resource.    
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Website information has been deemed equally valid as information from printed sources 
only if it comes from an official governmental website.        
Indicators: A two-part test will be used to determine if a central government has 
conferred greater autonomy upon a region as shown by an increase in the region’s independent 
fiscal ability. The first part of the test is whether the percentage of a region’s budget that is under 
regional control has increased. Such an increase in regional budgetary control can be 
implemented either through greater regional taxation power or the increased ability of the region 
to collect automatic monetary transfers from the nation state. The second part of the test is 
whether the region has gained additional independent fiscal ability over particular competences 
without losing fiscal ability in any other competences. This is a separate question from the 
region’s aggregate independent fiscal ability because it is possible for a region’s overall 
independent fiscal ability to remain the same but to be spread over more competences. 
Meeting either part of this test will be deemed to demonstrate an increase in the level of 
the region’s autonomy as long as the other part of the test does not yield a contradictory result. It 
is possible that in conferring upon a region an increase in its overall fiscal ability, the national 
government will not increase the number of competences within the region’s control. In this 
situation, the first part of the test—the percentage of a region’s total budget that is under its 
budgetary control—will still be met and the region will be deemed to have increased its real 
autonomy. It is also possible that a national government could increase the governmental 
competences that are within the budgetary control of a regional government while not increasing 
the percentage of a region’s total budget that is within its control. In that event, the region also 
would be deemed to have increased the level of autonomy because of its increased fiscal ability 
over a greater number of individual competences. If, however, the increase in regional 
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competences was accompanied by a reduction in the region’s overall independent fiscal ability, 
the region’s autonomy would not be considered to increase, as the two tests would give 
contradictory results. Likewise, if an increase in a region’s overall fiscal ability was 
accompanied by a reduction in regional competences, the region’s independent fiscal ability 
would not be considered to increase, as again the two tests would give contradictory results. This 
distinction is theoretically important because under such a set of contradictory results, a definite 
placement on the typological matrix cannot be made using the methodology of this study.  
With respect to regional activities within the EU there are two indicators. The indicator 
for determining whether a region seeks the assistance of the EU is whether the region has taken 
actions designed to gain the support of EU institutions for its effort to achieve greater autonomy. 
For purposes of this methodology, “seeking the assistance of EU institutions” will include any 
effort by a region to gain the EU’s support for a greater level of real autonomy as defined here. 
This support can be sought either as part of a regional representation within a governmental body 
of the EU or through efforts to influence EU policy from the outside. Outside efforts will include 
lobbying efforts by the region as well as public declarations by the regional government on 
pending EU legislation or on EU policies affecting the region’s autonomy status.  
The indicator for determining whether an EU institution has taken a position in support of 
greater regional autonomy will be consistent evidence from official EU documents and the 
statements of EU officials that the EU institution has taken such a position. 
If either of the last two indicators are positive, it will be concluded that there is EU 
activity in support of greater autonomy for the region.   
In all of the case studies selected, the levels of autonomies actually achieved fall short of 
the full autonomy goals of the respective regional autonomy movements. The methodology 
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selected here addresses these situations. Under the methodology selected, a regional autonomy 
movement will be considered successful even if it falls short of its original autonomy goals as 
long as it is able to increase the level of its real autonomy. For example, an autonomy movement 
that fails to achieve its original objective of national separation but is able to increase the 
governmental competences over which it has independent fiscal ability will be considered a 
success under the methodology used here.  
The above indicators are generalizable to all autonomies within the EU and are not 
limited to the particular case studies selected here. The independent fiscal ability of a region, 
both with regard to its overall budget and in relation to particular competences, can be 
determined for any region using the methodology described above by examining the region’s 
independent control over its aggregate budget as well as over individual competences. Likewise, 
it can be determined whether there is activity within the EU on behalf of any region’s autonomy 
by examining its activity within the EU on behalf of the regional autonomy, as defined above. 
What is being looked for here are specific EU actions designed to persuade the national 
government to accept a greater level of autonomy for the region. An EU body such as the EP 
could take direct action by, for example, enacting a resolution endorsing an expansion of a 
region’s fiscal ability where there is a dispute between the region and the national government. 
As will be shown below, the government of Flanders uses its official representation at the 
Commission on matters within its competence to seek to craft EU policies that dovetail with the 
policy objectives of the regional government. Alternatively, a region may engage in 
paradiplomatic activity within the EU in one of the many forms described above. Any of these 
activities, when spotted with respect to any European regional autonomy, would be an indication 
that there is activity within the EU on behalf of the region’s autonomy.  
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As in the four cases evaluated in the present thesis, when additional European regions 
were considered, high credibility would be given to individual, officially recorded actions of EU 
bodies. But for the paradiplomatic activities of regional lobbyists where verification is more 
difficult, a consistent pattern of action would need to be established through a composite 
evaluation of all of the region’s reported activities at the EU.  
Using these indicators developed in this thesis, it can thus be determined whether any 
region within the EU has increased the level of its autonomy.  
Alternative methodology:  
Under a possible alternative methodology, results would be ranked along a “greater” and 
“lesser” continuum. Essentially, a number line would be created that could be broken down into 
intervals of any amount. Two possibilities for measuring national actions on such a number line 
would be the changes in each region’s fiscal ability expressed as percentages, or the percentage 
of competences transfer the region’s control from among a selected list applied to all of the 
studied regions. A possibility for numerically measuring activity within the EU would be to 
count the total numbers of separate regional paradiplomatic activities and official EU actions that 
are intended to have an impact on the autonomy. 
A meaningful analysis of continuously varying evidence would require a much larger 
number of case studies than four used to fill out the matrix described above. Later studies may 
attempt to build on the present research by selecting particular evidence categories determined to 
be most important, developing quantitative scales to measure them, and then applying the 
measurements to a large sample of case studies that include many of the autonomy movements 
within Europe. This is a potential evolution for a later study that builds upon the present, 
qualitative research.  
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CHAPTER 6: HYPOTHESES 
 The typology and methodology developed above will enable the testing of two 
alternative, hypotheses. These two hypotheses, tested in conjunction, can provide an empirical 
answer to the question of whether it is the actions of the affected national government or the 
activities within the EU on behalf of a region’s efforts towards greater autonomy that determine 
the success of an autonomy movement.    
H1: The success of a regional autonomy movement in achieving greater level of 
autonomy depends on whether the national government supports or opposes greater 
autonomy. 
The logic behind this hypothesis is that the EU, despite its supranational characteristics, 
remains a treaty between independent nation-states that retain sole control over their territorial 
borders. Evidence for such an understanding of the EU can be found in the language of Articles 
1, 4(2) and 52 of the TEU cited above, as well as in the statements of EU officials cited in this 
thesis.    
If this hypothesis accords with the results of the four case studies, the two upper boxes in 
the typology in Table 1, for which Flanders and Scotland have been selected as the case studies, 
will represent successful separatist movements and the two lower boxes, represented by 
Catalonia and Åland, will represent unsuccessful ones. This hypothesis will be refuted under any 
other combination of results. Specifically, the hypothesis will be refuted if one or both upper 
boxes represent an unsuccessful separatist movement or if one or both lower boxes represent a 
successful separatist movement. Either of those results would show that the actions of a national 
government are not determinative in the success or failure of regional autonomy movements. 
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H2: The success of a regional autonomy movement in achieving greater autonomy 
depends on activities within the EU in support of the region’s greater autonomy. 
The logic behind this hypothesis is that the EU has emerged as a new form of three-tier, 
supra-national federalism in which extensive competences have been transferred from the 
national to the European level and regions have assumed a significant role through the 
representation of their members in EU institutions. As such, the EU can be expected to wield 
extensive influence over regional autonomy issues within nation states, and activities within the 
EU can be anticipated as having an effect on the success of autonomy movements.    
If this hypothesis accords with the results of the four case studies, the two boxes on the 
left of the typology in Table 1, represented by Flanders and Catalonia, will represent successful 
separatist movements and the two boxes on the right, represented by Scotland and Åland, will 
represent unsuccessful ones. The hypothesis will be refuted under any other combination of 
results. Specifically, the hypothesis will be refuted if one or both boxes on the left represent an 
unsuccessful separatist movement or if one or both boxes on the right represent a successful 
separatist movement. Either of those results would show that activities within the EU on behalf 
of a region’s greater autonomy are not determinative in the success or failure of regional 
autonomy movements.    
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CHAPTER 7: ÅLAND 
Historical background: The autonomy of the Åland Islands14 is distinguished by both its 
longevity (dating back nearly a century) and its foundation in an international treaty. More than 
95% of the population of the islands is Swedish-speaking. When Finland became independent in 
1917, most Åland residents wanted to rejoin Sweden but Finland was not willing to cede the 
islands. The Finnish government was, however, willing to grant to Åland a high degree of 
autonomy. The Finnish government enacted an Autonomy Act in 1920 which stated that 
“Ålanders should have the ability to arrange their own lives as freely as is possible for a region 
that is not a state” (Simolin 20). The issue of Åland’s status was brought to the League of 
Nations for consideration. In June 1921, the Council of the League of Nations declared that 
Åland would remain a part of Finland under an autonomy arrangement. Under this arrangement, 
Finland was required to provide Åland with a broad amount of self-government and to preserve 
its Swedish language and culture (Vieztez & Kallonen). It has been argued that the League of 
Nations agreement also has the status of a treaty between Sweden and Finland (Seyersted 25). In 
1922, the Finnish government incorporated the terms of the League of Nations ruling into an Act 
of Guarantees for Åland that supplemented its 1920 Autonomy Act. (Simonin 16)).  
Subsequently, the Finnish government enacted Autonomy Acts in 1951 and 1991 that 
expanded the scope of Åland’s autonomy. The 1920 Autonomy Act included a list of 
competences under the control of the national government. The regional parliament of Åland had 
authority to legislate in all areas that were not on this list. However, there were no guarantees 
that Åland could keep its autonomous powers because the national government had the power to 
add new areas of governance to its powers. In contrast, the 1951 Autonomy Act enumerated 
areas of competence held by the government of Åland. Any changes to this list of regional 
                                                
14 Hereinafter referred to as “Åland”. 
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powers required a qualified majority of two-thirds of both the Finnish national parliament and 
the Åland parliament. Åland’s regional competences included social welfare, housing, 
municipalities, public order, the environment, forestry, agriculture, fishing, mining rights, and 
radio and television. The 1951 Act also expanded the principle of domicile first contained in the 
1920 Act. Under the earlier Act, Finnish citizens from outside the islands had to reside in Åland 
for at least 5 years in order to vote or run for office in regional elections (Simolin 16). The 1951 
imposed the same 5-year requirement on the ownership of real estate and practicing a trade or 
profession (Hepburn 472). 
The 1991 Autonomy Act provided that taxes, duties, and fees would be collected by the 
national government (Simolin 27-28). In return, Åland would receive an annual lump sum from 
the Finnish national government equal to 0.45% of total national revenues. The government of 
Åland was given full discretion how to spend this lump sum (Hepburn 475). The 1991 Act also 
established a list of competences currently held by the Finnish government that could be 
transferred to Åland in the future through ordinary legislative majorities of the national and 
regional parliaments rather than two-thirds votes in favor (Simolin 27).  
Under the 1991 Autonomy Act, the scope of Åland’s autonomy is entirely defined by 
national legislation. Åland has a 30-member legislature (the Lagting). Administrative duties are 
divided in 7 departments, each headed by a minister who is a member of parliament. The chief 
minister is known as the “premier” of the autonomy. The governor of Åland is the representative 
of the Finnish government. The president of Finland selects the governor in consensus with the 
Åland premier. If the two cannot agree on a nominee, the Finnish president appoints the 
governor from among 5 candidates selected by the Lagting (Vieytez and Kallonen 260). The 
Åland delegation is a 5-member body with 2 representatives each from the Åland and Finnish 
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governments, with the governor of Åland serving as chair. The purpose of the Åland delegation 
is to mediate disputes between the national and Åland governments (Vieytez and Kallonen 261).     
The 1991 Autonomy Act strictly divides the powers that are within the jurisdiction of the 
Lagting and those which are within the jurisdiction of the Finnish national government. Even for 
matters within the national jurisdiction, the Finnish government must obtain an opinion from the 
Åland government on matters of special importance to Åland (Hannikainen 184). The Lagting 
can legislate only on matters within its competence. It has no judicial authority and very limited 
taxing authority. The Finnish Supreme Court plays an important advisory role in Åland’s 
autonomy arrangement. All legislation enacted by the Parliament of Åland is presented to the 
Supreme Court for a determination whether the Lagting has exceeded its authority (Hepburn). 
This report is then sent to the president of Finland, who has final authority whether to approve 
the legislation (Hepburn 474). 
There is a separate Åland citizenship. To be a naturalized citizen of Åland, a person must 
reside in the islands continuously for 5 years and have proficiency in Swedish. This requirement 
for regional citizenship is important in a country where more than 94% of the people speak 
Finnish as their first language, as it guaranteed that there would not be an influx of new Åland 
citizens from other parts of the country who would weaken Åland’s Swedish character. Only 
Åland citizens can vote in regional elections, own real property, and practice a trade or 
profession (Hannikainen 185-86). Åland has the ability to express an independent voice in affairs 
affecting all of Scandinavia, as it has 2 out of 87 seats in the Nordic Council of Scandinavian 
nations (Hannikainen 185). 
Following the enactment of the 1991 Autonomy Act, the next stage in the development of 
Åland’s autonomy involved Åland’s relationship with the EU. Finland entered the EU under the 
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1994 Treaty of Accession. The country has a system under which international treaties entered 
into by the country must be adopted as part of national law. Whenever a treaty contains a term 
that falls within the competence of the Åland government, the 1991 Autonomy Act requires the 
Lagting to give consent or the treaty does not enter into force in Åland (Silverström 263). Åland 
thus had the power to accept or reject entry into the EU. Following an advisory referendum in 
which 74% of Åland voters approved EU membership, the Lagting voted 26-4 to enter the EU in 
connection with Finland’s accession (“Aland and the EU”).  
Article 299 (5) of Finland’s 1994 Treaty of Accession provides that it shall apply to 
Åland in accordance with a separate Protocol No. 2 (OJ C 241, published August 29, 1994). The 
preamble to the protocol “states that the treaties shall apply to Aland with certain derogations, 
which are justified with reference to the special status Åland enjoys under international law” 
(Silverström 268). The first derogation relates to regional Åland citizenship. The second 
derogation relates to “turnover taxes, excise duties, and other forms of indirect taxation 
[and]…ensures the continuation of tax-free sales on ferry traffic to and from Åland (Silverström 
268).   
The question of Åland’s relation to the EU arose again at the time of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Finland ratified this treaty in June 2008. The Parliament of Åland, however, did not approve the 
treaty immediately and made its approval of the treaty contingent on the granting of four 
requests. One of these requests was a right for Åland to appear before the European Court of 
Justice. The second request was for greater input by Åland within the EU Council of Ministers. 
A third request was participation by Åland in the application of the principle of subsidiarity, that 
is, in determinations whether a competence should be exercised at the EU, national, or 
subnational level of governance. Finally, Åland requested a seat in the European Parliament 
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(Skoutaris). The Finnish national government granted the first three of the above requests but did 
not accept the request for an Åland representative in the European Parliament (Skoutaris). 
Instead, on April 23, 2009 the Finnish government stated that it would “contribute to develop the 
possibilities for the Åland Islands to influence the process in the European Parliament 
[and]…“will when future negotiations in the EU regarding distributions of seats in the European 
Parliament will be held, keep this in account[.]”  (Legitimate representations of the Åland Islands 
in the European Parliament). On November 25, 2009, one week before the Lisbon Treaty was to 
take effect, the Åland parliament approved the treaty. 
Åland has had an active independence movement. An Åland Independence party, Ålands 
Framtid, was established in 2001. As of 2017, the party holds 3 out of 30 seats in the Lagting. 
The party seeks a referendum on independence. (“Åland’s separatist party wants an 
independence referendum”). So far, no steps toward such a referendum have been taken.  
Åland’s autonomy under the Lisbon Treaty: The national government has implemented a 
system under which Åland has the right to provide input on EU matters within the Finnish 
national government. The latest amendments to the Autonomy Act, added in 2004 and 2009, add 
a chapter on Åland’s participation in the EU (Hepburn 476). Åland has the right to participate in 
the preparation of Finland’s national positions on issues before the EU. The Ministerial 
Committee on EU Affairs, chaired by the Finnish Prime Minister, develops “Finland’s EU policy 
guidelines for the formal and informal meetings of the Council of the EU…The chairman of the 
government of Åland has the right to be heard by [this committee]…when the matter falls within 
the mandate of the Åland Islands or is otherwise of special importance to Åland” (Finnish 
Government Ministerial Committees). Additionally, the Finnish Parliament has established a 
Grand Committee that formulates the parliament’s stance on legislative, budget, and treaty issues 
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being decided by the EU. The single Åland representative in the Finnish Parliament is entitled to 
participate in Grand Committee meetings (Parliament of Finland). If the Finnish and Åland 
positions cannot be harmonized, Åland can present its position separately to the EU Council of 
Ministers.  
Åland’s formal EU representation is limited to the Committee of the Regions. Within the 
Committee of the Regions, Åland has one regular and one alternate member (European 
Committee of the Regions “National delegation of Finland”). No indication has been found that 
Åland engages in any paradiplomatic activities within EU institutions. The Åland government 
has not established an EU office. 
Åland’s lack of representation in the European Parliament has been a source of 
contention between the regional and national governments and continues to be so. In 2007, the 
Finnish parliament rejected a proposal from Åland to grant the region one out of the 14 European 
Parliament positions belonging to Finland (Silverström 269). As noted above, Finland refused to 
back down on this refusal even in 2008 and 2009 when the Åland parliament threatened to reject 
the Lisbon Treaty based on this issue. The government of Åland has declared on its website that 
the Finnish government’s rejection of its representation in the EU parliament is unacceptable 
(“Aland and the EU”). The president of the European Free Alliance, noting that Finland’s seats 
in the European Parliament may rise from 13 to 14 following Brexit, wrote in April 2018 that 
“[t]he Finnish government is, despite the promises to strive for an extra seat for Åland, opposing 
any redistribution of seats in the European Parliament” (“Concerning: the legitimate 
representation of the Åland Islands in the European Parliament”). There is a question why 
Finland would reject the modest proposal to give Åland a single EU parliamentary seat. A 
possible answer is provided by Ackrén and Lindström, who point out that Finland has adopted “a 
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legally and politically restrictive interpretation of the autonomy, meaning that all policy areas 
which were not explicitly addressed in the Autonomy Act as home rule competences were 
regarded as metropolitan state competences” (Ackrén and Lindström at 499).  
The issue of Åland’s representation within the EU directly relates to the strength of its 
autonomy. Because of Finland’s entry into the EU, Åland’s government actually may be actually 
be losing some of its autonomous authority. The reason for this because of Finland’s EU 
membership, competences formerly reserved by nations to the national or regional levels have 
been transferred to the European level of governance. Examples of such competences are in 
agriculture, fisheries, and the environment. Another example of an EU law that aroused great 
concern in Åland at the time of the signing of the Lisbon treaty was the ban on the sale of the 
smokeless mouth tobacco known as “snus” that was a source of substantial income to Ålanders. 
There was resentment in Åland that the Finnish government did not support Åland in its desire to 
keep snus legal (Dowling).   
Elisabeth Naclaur, a member of the Finnish Parliament representing Åland, has described 
the region’s loss of governing authority under the EU as “leaking competences. (Hepburn 476). 
An important way that Åland can prevent a loss of regional autonomy due to Europeanization is 
to have a meaningful voice within the EU Parliament. The Finnish government’s continuing 
refusal to grant Åland with EU Parliament representation deprives the region of this voice. The 
refusal of the government of Finland to grant Åland an EU parliamentary seat can therefore be 
seen as an indication that the national government is not supportive of Åland’s autonomous 
powers even in their present form.  
The Finnish government is on record as opposing changes to the Autonomy Act that 
would have the effect of expanding Åland’s autonomy. Simolin has analyzed the contents of 
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three recent reports on the Åland autonomy: a 2010 report prepared by an Åland parliamentary 
committee; a 2013 report by a working group of the Finnish parliament; and finally a 2013 report 
prepared by a joint committee of the Finnish and Åland parliaments. The joint committee report 
was published in the form of a Finnish government proposal in 2017 (Simolin 17). The three 
reports contain major differences with respect to transfers of competences from the Finnish to the 
Åland governments as well as on the issue of taxation.  
Concerning transfers of competences, the report of the Åland parliamentary committee 
suggested that there should be a single listing of competences under the control of the national 
government. This listing would replace the present language in the Autonomy Act that separately 
sets forth the competences that are in the hands of the national and regional governments. The 
committee further proposed that the Åland government alone should have authority to decide 
which competences should be transferred from the national to the regional level, using a 
simplified procedure. Under this proposal, the extent of Åland’s autonomy would be entirely 
determined by the Åland government itself (Simolin 25-26). This change in the autonomy would 
bring Åland very close to national independence, as the national government could no longer 
effectively place limits on the region’s governmental powers.  
The Finnish government report took an opposite approach, insisting that any change in 
the autonomy scheme must gain the approval of both the national and regional governments. The 
Finnish report stated that any changes in Åland’s competences should be based on “ ‘real need’ 
and a thorough evaluation of the consequences.” Furthermore, the changes could go either 
way—towards an increase or reduction in regional competences (Simolin 26).   
The joint Finland-Åland committee suggested leaving the present allocation of 
competences unchanged for the present, with any future changes depending on changes in 
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society. The joint committee did, however, support changes in the autonomy that would make 
transfers of competences easier than under the present system under which most transfers require 
two-thirds approval of the national and Åland parliaments. As a substitute for the present system, 
the joint committee proposed to allow transfers of competences in a way modeled after that of 
the Faroe Islands. Under the joint committee proposal, competences would be divided into three 
categories. For competences in the first category, transfer to Åland could occur only through a 
supermajority vote of both parliaments. For competences in the second category, transfer could 
be approved under the ordinary legislative procedure requiring simple majority votes (as is 
already provided for some competences under the 1991 amendments to the Autonomy Act). 
Finally, competences in the third category could be transferred to Åland following consultation 
with the national government. This is a procedure that does not currently exist, and it would 
become significantly easier to transfer the competences that fell within this third category 
(Simolin 26-27). 
For purposes of the present study, the joint Finnish-Åland parliamentary report will be 
considered the best available information concerning the present position of the Finnish 
government concerning the transfer of national competences to Åland. This appears a reasonable 
conclusion both because of its very recent, 2017 date of publication and because it represents 
final positions arrived at following a process of interaction and consultation between members of 
the Finnish and Åland parliaments. The joint committee report indicates a willingness by the 
Finnish parliament to ease the process of transferring some competences from the Finnish 
national government to Åland at some future date if changes in society make this desirable. The 
extent of the possible transfers in competence is left unclear and depends entirely on the specific 
tier placements of each specific competence—a topic the report does not address. 
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The three reports also differed significantly with taxation issues. The Åland 
parliamentary report favored a strengthening of the Åland government’s regional taxation 
powers. It asserted that the present system, under which a fixed percentage of national revenues 
are transferred to Åland, does not have the flexibility to take into account the changing fiscal 
needs of the region and is not cost-efficient. The report cited other autonomies under which there 
is both regional taxing authority and transfers of revenues from the central government. The 
Åland report also suggested an increase in the percentage share of national tax revenues 
transferred to Åland from its current level of 0.45% (Simolin 28). In contrast, the Finnish 
parliamentary report stated that the present taxation system worked well. This report rejected 
both a delegation of taxing authority to Åland and any increase in the transfer amounts from the 
national government. The joint committee report basically took the Finnish parliamentary 
position but proposed some minor revisions after considering several alternatives (Simolin 29-
30). Again accepting the joint committee report as the best available evidence of the current 
attitude of the Finnish government towards tax changes, it appears that the national government 
is not willing to significantly change the current system in which Åland has very little 
independent taxing power and is dependent for its finances on a fixed percentage transfer of 
national tax revenues. 
Summary: Åland’s system of autonomy has now lasted nearly a century. Throughout 
most of this period, the national Finnish state proved itself willing to support gradual increases in 
the region’s autonomy implemented through a series of legislative changes contained in the 
Autonomy Acts of 1951 and 1991. Since Åland entered into the EU in 2009, however, there have 
been no further transfers of competences from the Finnish nation state to Åland. Åland has, in 
fact, lost competences during this period to the EU. Finland’s refusal to grant Åland a seat in the 
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European Parliament shows that the Finnish national government does not oppose this trend 
toward “competence leakage.” Furthermore, the national government of Finland has indicated its 
refusal to allow Åland to either impose its own regional taxes or to receive a greater share of 
national revenues than those provided under the transfer formula in the 1991 Autonomy Act. 
This means that Finland is unwilling to increase the fiscal ability of Åland, as it was defined in 
the theory section. It must be concluded that despite the willingness of the Finnish nation state to 
gradually grant more autonomy to Åland in the years before the Lisbon Treaty, since that treaty 
took effect in 2009 the national government has opposed further increases in the scope of 
Åland’s autonomy. Further research is required as to why the Finnish nation state has reversed its 
previous position in support of increased autonomy for Åland.  
Åland has not significantly attempted to work within EU institutions to increase its 
autonomy. It has not engaged in paradiplomatic activity to promote its autonomy efforts and has 
not even established an EU office. The only indication that Åland may have tried to influence 
EU institutions is found in the statement by the president of the European Free Alliance (EFA), 
cited above, in support of an EU parliamentary seat for the region. As discussed above, however, 
Åland is not seeking representation in the EU Parliament to increase its autonomy within the 
Finnish nation state but rather to prevent leakages in its autonomy to European institutions.  
No evidence has been found that Åland has worked within the EU to change the terms of 
its autonomy arrangement with Finland, and no indication of action by EU institutions on behalf 
of Åland’s autonomy has been found. Åland is thus an example of a region in which the nation 
state opposes greater autonomy and there has not been activity within EU institutions to attempt 
to increase the level of this autonomy. 
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CHAPTER 8: CATALONIA 
Historical background: Under the Spanish constitution of 1978, Catalonia is one of the 
17 autonomous communities of Spain and is designated as a “historic nationality.” The Spanish 
Constitution of 1978 established Spain as a unitary state. Section 2 of this constitution declared 
that it was based on “the insoluble unity of the Spanish nation.” This section also “guarantees the 
autonomy of the nationalities that are part of [Spain] and the solidarity between all of them.” 
Section 137 of this constitution provided that each of the country’s municipalities, provinces, and 
independent communities were separate autonomies (Spanish Constitution). Not all of these 
autonomies are on an equal footing with respect to their possibilities for self-government. Until 
the 1990s, Catalonia was among a select group of autonomies designated as a “historic 
nationalities.” This designation gave it among the broadest opportunities for autonomy that are 
possible within the Spanish Constitution. By the mid-1990s, however, the Spanish central 
government had removed the distinction between historic nationalities and other autonomous 
communities (Elias & Mees 144).  
Section 92 of the Spanish Constitution allowed referendums on “political decisions of 
particular importance.” This section gives Catalonia authority to conduct consultative (non-
binding) referenda that can include referenda on issues of regional autonomy. Such referenda had 
to be proposed by the Spanish President and authorized by Congress. The national government, 
however, retaineds ultimate power over all regional autonomy efforts, and can stop them if it so 
decides (Spanish Constitution).  
Section 155 of the Spanish Constitution contains the so-called “nuclear option” providing 
that “if a self-governing community does not fulfill the obligations imposed upon it by the 
Constitution or other laws,” or acts in a way that is “seriously prejudicial to the general interest 
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of Spain,” the central government, following approval of the Senate, “may take all measures 
necessary to compel the community to meet such obligations, or to protect the aforementioned 
general interest.” Section 155 was never put into effect until October 2017, when the government 
of Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy used it to strip the Catalonian parliament of its powers 
and take direct control of the province. From these constitutional provisions, it is evident that, 
although autonomy of various degrees is possible for the Spanish regions, it is always subject to 
the Spanish state’s ability to revoke it. Independence for Catalonia is prohibited under Spain’s 
unitary government structure.   
Unlike the autonomies of the Spanish regions of Navarre and the Basque Country, the 
autonomy of the Catalonian provincial government does not extend to fiscal matters. Under the 
so-called “foral” system, the Basque Country and Navarre “write a check to Madrid at the end of 
the year” and receive reimbursement for the governmental expenses. This system, in effect, gives 
these regions full fiscal ability. Catalonia, in contrast, has remained under the “common system” 
that relies upon appropriations decided upon by the Spanish government (Council on Foreign 
Relations). 76.7% of Catalonian provincial revenues come from taxes “ceded” at the time of 
collection by the national government and 22.2% of revenues come from an “equalization 
transfer” from the national treasury as well as other funds from the EU (Andreu 116). The 
“equalization transfers” have the effect of disadvantaging Catalonia financially. As one of 
Spain’s wealthiest regions, each year Catalonia pays approximately €10 billion more in taxes 
than it receives from the nation state than it receives. (In contrast, Andalusia, Spain’s poorest 
region, receives €8 billion more annually in transfer payments than it receives) (Berwick).   
Although Catalonia has limited taxation powers, these represent a small percentage of 
total provincial tax revenues. Income, company, and value-added taxes are all collected by the 
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national government and totaled about €42 billion annually as of 2016. The Catalonian 
government collects taxes on wealth, inheritance, gambling and transport that totaled about €3 
billion during the same year (Berwick). Thus, provincial taxes amount to less than 7 percent of 
total tax revenues.  
The Catalonian regional parliament, the Generalitat, was re-established in 1977 after 40 
years. The Generalitat codified its autonomy in the 1979 Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. This 
statute divided the authority of the Catalonian government into three categories:  powers held 
“exclusively” by the Catalonian government; powers deemed exclusive but which were limited 
by the Spanish government’s “rules for organizing economic activity;” and finally, powers for 
which Catalonia could only act “[w]ithin the framework of basic Spanish legislation and as 
appropriate, under the terms established by the relevant legislation.”15 The major problem with 
the 1979 autonomy arrangement turned out to be the Catalonian government’s inability to collect 
taxes. Catalonia is Spain’s fourth wealthiest regional economy (Boylan 765). During the 
                                                
15 Powers held “exclusively” by the Catalonian government included institutions of self-government, the 
development of Catalonian civil law, heritage (artistic, historic, and scientific), tourism, the local government 
system, regional planning, housing, internal transport, internal public works with no outside impact, welfare, 
transport, fishing in inland waters, culture, sport, gambling, and provincial statistics (Article 9).   
Powers deemed “exclusive” but which were limited by the Spanish government’s “rules for organizing 
economic activity.” These included, among others, provincial economic planning, industry, agriculture, internal 
trade, consumer protection, and credit institutions (Article 12). Education was declared to be an exclusive 
Catalonian power within constitutional limitations (Article 15). For other governmental functions, the government of 
Catalonia possessed more limited authority, as it was directed to act These functions included (among others) 
administration of the Catalonian government, government contracts, the civil service system, labor relations, the 
organization of credit, banking and insurance, mining and energy, employment and labor relations, and 
environmental protection (Article 10).  
The Catalonian government was directed to enforce Spanish law in several areas that included (among 
others) penal institutions, employment, and intellectual and industrial property (Article 11).   
In matters relating to health and social security, the Catalonian government was directed both to enforce 
Spanish law and to develop legislation (Article 17).  
The statute allowed the government of Catalonia to establish an autonomous police force (Article 13) but 
also provided that national security forces could intervene “on their own initiative, when they consider the interests 
of the State to be seriously compromised, and with the approval of the Security Committee [made up of an equal 
number of Spanish and Catalonian members] (Article 14).  
Even though Catalonian civil law was under the control of the province, the King of Spain appointed the 
president of the Catalonian High Court of Justice and high court magistrates were to be appointed in a manner 
provided by Spanish law (Article 21).  
The 1979 Statute of Autonomy left the Spanish central government fully in control of defense, international 
relations, administration of justice (outside of Catalan civil law) and taxation (Mermel 13).
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worldwide economic recession that began in 2008, Catalonian state finances suffered severely.16 
This reduction forced cuts in government programs for social services and immigration 
(Catalonia was at this time receiving substantial numbers of poorer immigrants from southern 
Spain) (Barcia 403). Faced with this unfavorable fiscal relationship with the Spanish central 
government, it is no wonder that the Catalonian government and people sought a new autonomy 
scheme in which they could collect their own taxes. It was the immediate and pressing fiscal 
concerns of the region that drove the process of greater autonomy forward with such urgency.  
The 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia significantly expanded the province’s 
autonomy. Unlike the earlier statute, it identified Catalonia as a nation.17 The statute contained 
223 articles defining Catalonia’s specific powers in substantive areas of law compared to 57 
articles in the earlier autonomy law (Andreu 99). The Catalonian government gained important 
new authority in the area of executive powers through a new rulemaking authority (Andreu 106). 
Similarly to the 1979 law, the 2006 statute categorized the authority of the Catalonian 
government as consisting of “exclusive powers” of the Generalitat, “shared powers,” and 
“executive powers.” The areas of exclusive provincial power were laid out in much greater detail 
than before (Articles 110-173). The purpose of this more specific enumeration was to clarify the 
exact scope of the Catalonian government powers so that they could not be infringed upon by the 
Spanish state (a process referred to by the Catalonians as “blindage’) (Andreu 99-100). An 
important new provincial power relating to use of the Catalan language was added by Article 
                                                16 The Catalonian population of approximately 7.54 million in 2012 represented approximately 16% of the 
total Spanish population, but accounted for 18.7% of Spanish GDP as of 2011 (Barcia 419-420). Catalonia 
consistently gives more in tax revenues to the Spanish state than it receives in government benefits, contributing 
about 19% to the Spanish central government’s total tax base but receiving only about 14% back in return. The 
Catalonian deficit rose from 8% of GDP in 2007 to more than 25% of GDP in 2012. Because of the economic 
recession, the amount of funds distributed to the Catalonian government from the Spanish central government fell 
drastically, from 72.8 million euros in 2011 to only 5.2 million euros in 2013—a reduction of 92% (Boylan 765). 
17 The preamble stated that “[i]n reflection of the feelings and the wishes of the citizens of Catalonia, the 
Parliament of Catalonia has defined Catalonia as a nation by an ample majority.” 
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143, entitled “Catalonia’s own language.”18 Article I of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy (Articles 
15-54) was entitled “Rights, obligations and governing principles). The 1999 autonomy statute 
had only referred to rights and duties under the Spanish constitution. In contrast, Article I listed a 
large variety of rights under Catalonian law. The new statutory rights cover a wide variety of 
areas. Chapter 1 of Article I list civil and social rights and obligations including the rights of the 
elderly, women and minors, death with dignity, high-quality education, equal access to culture, 
health services and welfare, health and safety standards at work, decent housing, a sustainable 
environment, and consumer protection. Chapter II lists political rights that include the rights to 
participate equally in public affairs, access to government services, and evidence protection. 
Chapter III guaranteed citizens the right to communicate with government authorities in the 
language of their choice and to receive an education in the Catalan language. Chapters IV and V 
put enforcement power behind the listing of rights. Chapter IV provides in part that any act that 
undermined the rights listed in the first three chapters can be appealed before the Supreme Court 
of Catalonia. Article 39 (1) of Chapter V stated that the public authorities of Catalonia should 
“direct public policy in accordance with the governing principles established by the Constitution 
and this Estatut [statute],” and authorized “the public authorities of Catalonia [to]…promote and 
adopt any measures necessary to guarantee their full effectiveness.”  
Title III of the 2006 autonomy statute made the High Court of Justice of Catalonia “the 
supreme jurisdictional body of the legal system in Catalonia and it is competent, under the terms 
established by the corresponding organic law, to hear the appeals and cases of the different 
                                                
18 Article 143 (1) provided that “the Generalitat of Catalonia has exclusive power over the matter of 
Catalonia's own language. This power includes, in any case, determination of the scope, uses and legal effects of its 
official status, and also the linguistic normalisation of Catalan.” This provision was reinforced by Article 8 of the 
Preliminary Title which stated that “Catalonia's own language is Catalan. As such, Catalan is the language of normal 
and preferential use in Public Administration bodies and in the public media of Catalonia, and is also the language 
of normal use for teaching and learning in the education system.” 	
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jurisdictional areas, and to protect the rights recognised in this Estatut.” Formerly, supreme 
judicial authority over the Catalonian legal system was held by the Spanish Tribunal Supremo 
(Supreme Tribunal) (Andreu 107).   
Major expansions of Catalonia’s taxation authority were contained in Title VI of the 2006 
autonomgy statute entitled “Funding of the Generalitat.” Article 202 (1) of this title declared that 
“[t]he Generalitat has autonomous finances and sufficient financial resources for the proper 
exercise of self-government.” Article 203 (1) provided that “[t]he Generalitat has the capacity to 
determine the volume and composition of revenues falling within its financial powers, and also 
to freely apply its resources to expenditure items as it deems fit.” Article 204 created the 
Taxation Agency of Catalonia that would be “responsible for management, collection, settlement 
and inspection of all Generalitat of Catalonia taxes and also, when delegated by the State, of 
State taxes which are totally ceded to the Generalitat.”  
Under Article 203 (2), the Generalitat could ”[participate] in the income arising from 
State taxes ceded to Catalonia.” Article 206 (3) provides that “[t]he financial resources available 
to the Generalitat may be adjusted to enable the State financing system to have sufficient 
resources to ensure leveling and solidarity with other autonomous communities.” Article 210 
established a joint Spanish-Catalonian Joint Economic and Fiscal Affairs Commission that 
would monitor and make recommendations concerning the distributions of Spanish tax revenues 
to Catalonia.  Taken together, Articles 203, 206 and 210 were intended to ensure that Catalonia 
receives national tax revenues on a more equitable basis than was previously the case.  
For a new autonomy statute to be enacted into law in Spain, it must first be passed by the 
Catalonian parliament, then approved by the Spanish parliament, and finally approved by the 
voters of Catalonia in a referendum. In September 2005, the Catalonian parliament approved a 
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new Law on Autonomy that it presented to the Spanish parliament. After months of negotiations 
between the two governments, the Spanish parliament passed the statute in March 2006. The 
majority party in Spain at that time was the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), which was 
more sympathetic to increased Catalonian autonomy than its main political rival, the 
conservative Partido Popular (Boylan 763). On June 18, 2006, Catalonian voters approved the 
new autonomy statute (“Catalonia endorses autonomy plan”). 
Events in Catalonia since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty through 2018: Following the 
enactment of the 2006 Statute on the Autonomy of Catalonia, the conservative Partido Popular 
challenged the constitutionality of the law before the Spanish Constitutional Court. On June 28, 
2010, the Constitutional Court entered its judgment (Constitutional Court Judgment No. 
31/2010). The Constitutional Court struck down major portions of the statute. It ruled as 
unconstitutional language in the statute’s preamble declaring Catalonia to be a nation. It declared 
that the new taxing scheme, in which Catalonia could collect its own taxes, was unconstitutional. 
It also struck down the provisions establishing the Catalonian Court of Justice as the highest 
judicial body in the province. With regard to the Catalan language, the court declared that 
Catalan could be the preferred language of education but not of government administration. The 
Court stated that the duty of Catalan citizens to master the Catalan language (as provided in the 
statute) was of secondary importance to their duty to master Castilian Spanish, the country’s 
official language (Pericay; Mermel 25-27).   
The Constitutional Court’s decision was the turning point that led a large portion of the 
Catalonian populace away from their struggle for greater autonomy into an effort for full 
independence (Calamur). The first actions in the independence struggle occurred at the local 
level. From September 2009 to April 2011, more than half of the 547 Catalonian municipalities 
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held informal independence referenda. Massive popular demonstrations in favor of independence 
followed these local referenda (Barcia 399). In December 2012, the leaders of Catalonia’s two 
major regional parties, Convergència i Unió (CiU) (“Convergence and Union”) and Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) (“Republican Left of Catalonia”) reached agreement to hold a 
non-binding independence referendum in 2014. The Spanish Constitutional Court, however, 
struck down this proposed referendum. The Catalonian government responded by calling a 
referendum without central government approval. The vote was labeled as a “non-referendum 
popular consultation on the future of Catalonia.” A majority voted in favor of an independent 
state (Medir 268).19     
 The provincial election of September 2015 was widely seen as another vote on 
Catalonian independence (Elias & Mees 149). The Catalonian nationalist coalition Junts pel Sí 
(“Together for Yes”) fell short of an absolute individual majority but was able to form a majority 
in coalition with a smaller party, the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) (“Catalonia vote: Pro-
independence parties win elections”). The new Catalonian government called for a popular 
referendum on independence that was held on October 1, 2017. In contrast to the 2014 
consultative referendum which was non-binding, the new “self-determination referendum law” 
was declared to be binding and to serve as a means for initiating Catalonian independence.20 The 
“yes” side received approximately 90% of the vote although turnout again was low at only about 
42 % (Soares). As voting was taking place, Spanish police seized ballot boxes and physically 
attacked voters (Edwards). On October 17, the Spanish Constitutional Court declared the 
referendum to be illegal (“Catalonia: Spain’s constitutional court declares Catalan referendum 
                                                
19 2.3 million people voted out of an electorate of 6 million (Erikson). The low turnout cast doubt on the 
strength of the independence movement. 
20 The question on the ballot was “do you want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of a 
republic”? (Child & Mitchell).	
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law void”). On October 21, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy approved the implementation 
of Section 155 of the Spanish Constitution that allowed the Spanish government to take back the 
budgetary powers of the Catalonian government (Jones). On October 27, the Catalonian 
parliament voted to unilaterally declare independence. On the same day, the Spanish government 
dissolved Catalonia’s parliament and called for new Catalonian elections on December 21 (Parra 
& Giles). In these December 21 elections, the pro-independence parties gained a narrow victory.  
A new Spanish government headed by the Socialist Pedro Sánchez came to power on 
June 2, 2018. Six days later, on June 8, 2018, Spain’s new government lifted spending controls 
on Catalonia under Article 155 and returned provincial budgetary authority to the Generalitat 
(“New Spanish government to return Catalonia’s autonomous financial powers”). Even under the 
new government, however, Catalonia’s autonomy crisis was not resolved, as the Spanish 
government continued criminal proceedings against members of the Catalonian government.21 
Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez said in parliament that “the movement for a Catalan state is 
based on ‘lies’” and promised a “forceful” response if the Catalonian government breaks the law 
(“Spanish government vows ‘forceful’ response if Catalonia breaks law”).   
Catalonia and the EU: Section 149.1.3 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides that 
the Spanish state shall have exclusive competence in foreign relations. When Spain acceded to 
EU membership in 1986, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia established regional offices 
in Brussels. The Spanish government challenged the constitutionality of the Basque EU 
delegation before the Spanish Constitutional Court (Lecours 11). In 1994, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court in 1994 affirmed the constitutionality of the regional EU offices but limited 
                                                
21 Nine Catalonian government leaders remain imprisoned in Spain on charges of rebellion, sedition, and misuse of 
public funds. Carles Puigdemont, the Catalonian President at the time of the 2017 independence referendum and 
several other Catalan government officials are currently in exile from Spain facing the same charges (CatalanNews, 
December 18, 2018). 
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their scope (Spanish Constitutional Court Judgment 165/1994). According to the Constitutional 
Court, the regional EU offices were subject to the rule of in foro interno, in foro externo. Under 
this principle, the actions of the regions abroad could not exceed their internal powers. The 
regional offices in Brussels thus could not enter into treaties, represent the Spanish State abroad 
or “create international obligations and responsibilities” for the Spanish state, as these were 
powers that the Spanish Constitution reserved to the national government (Vicuña 22-23).  
In several of its provisions, the Catalonian Statute of Autonomy of 2006 envisions a close 
linkage between Catalonia and the EU.22 The 2010 decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court 
that limited Catalonia’s autonomy did not strike down any of the above provisions. Catalonia 
was thus free under Spanish law to pursue EU diplomacy within the general limits that the 
Constitutional Court had established in its earlier, 1994 decision relating to the permissible 
activities of regional diplomatic delegations.   
Initially, the Catalonian delegation to the EU was a public-private partnership entitled the 
Patronat Català pro-Europa. In recent years, however, Catalonian diplomatic efforts have been 
                                                
22 Article 3.2 of that statute, which is part of the Preliminary Title, states that “Catalonia has its political and 
geographical space of reference in the Spanish State and the EU, and it incorporates the values, principles and 
obligations implied by being a part thereof.” 
  Chapter II of Title V of the statute, containing nine articles (Article 184 through 192), is entitled “Relations 
of the Generalitat with the EU. ” Some of the key provisions of this chapter are the following:  
Article 184 states that the Generalitat participates, under the terms of this statute and Catalan legislation “in 
affairs related to the EU that affect the powers or interests of Catalonia.”  
Article 185 provides for review by the Generalitat of EU treaties (Article 185.1) and authorizes 
participation of Catalonian representatives in the negotiation and adoption of treaties “affecting the exclusive powers 
of the Generalitat” (Article 185.2).   
Article 186.1 provides for participation by the Generalitat in the formation of positions “in matters 
concerning the powers or interests of Catalonia…”   
Article 187.1 states that “[t]he Generalitat participates in Spanish delegations to the EU that deal with 
affairs within the legislative power of the Generalitat, and especially to the Council of Ministers and the consultative 
and drafting bodies of the Council and Commission.”  
Article 187.4 provides that the Catalonian “[p]arliament may establish relations with the European 
Parliament in areas of common interest.”  
Article 190 states that “the Generalitat is responsible for the management of European funds in matters 
within its jurisdiction.”   
Article 192 authorizes the Generalitat to “establish a delegation to better defend its interests before the 
institutions of the EU….” (Generalitat de Catalunya. “Text of the Statute approved in 2006”).       
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placed entirely under the control of the Catalonian presidency. A 2010 presidential decree 
brought all Catalonian diplomacy under the direct control of the President of Catalonia 
(Departament de la Presidència 2010, Art. 3.1.8) (Vicuña 27). A 2013 presidential decree created 
the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the EU within the Department of the Presidency  (Art.44.2 
of presidential decree 80/2014). Among its other duties, this secretariat is responsible for the 
delegation of the Generalitat to the EU (Vicuña 27). 
The assumption of presidential control over EU matters demonstrates an increased 
concern and involvement by the Catalonian government in EU affairs. Catalonia has also been 
seeking to influence EU policymaking in a broader range of policy areas. During the first 
decades of Catalonian representation at the EU, Catalonian lobbying efforts focused on regional 
economic promotion and cultural affairs (Vicuña 47). The Spanish Constitutional Court decision 
of 1994 had authorized lobbying by regional diplomatic delegations in these areas. More 
recently, however, Catalonian lobbying at the EU has included subjects prohibited by the 1994 
Constitutional Court ruling by taking positions on political matters that the national Constitution 
has reserved to the Spanish government.   
A review of the activities of Catalonia at the EU in 2017 and 2018 shows the large extent 
to which the Catalonian EU delegation has entered into the realm of European affairs and has 
sought to influence the EU to act on its behalf to strengthen its position with the Spanish state: 
 On September 13, 2017, Amadeu Altafaj, the representative of the Catalonian 
government to the EU, hosted an EU reception in which he spoke in support of Catalonia’s 
independence referendum and stated in part that “’[w]ith one million on the streets, any 
European country would realize there is a political problem…[o]ur aim has always been to reach 
an agreement with the Spanish government but this has proved impossible.”  
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On February 14, 2018, the Catalonian government announced that it had “decided to take 
a stand on each of the European programs relevant to Catalonia in order to ensure the 
regionalization of the funds.” These specifically included funds for agricultural subsidies. 
Catalonia’s General Director of Economic Promotion, Competition and Regulation “insisted on 
the need to increase coordination among all involved agents, both to make Catalonia more 
influential on the European level, and to increase the positive impact of the proper management 
of European funds.” 
On the same day, the Catalonian EU delegation presented its position “on the future of 
the EU Research and Innovation policy (Horizon Europe)…[to stress] the need of regional and 
local dimension to be taken into account.” 
On June 6, 2018, Amadeu Altafay condemned the negative response of EU institutions to 
the Catalonian independence movement (described below). He said that:  
So far, the EU has been shown itself as a private club of states at 
uncertain hours, harassed by problems such as Brexit or the loss of 
credibility in the eyes of a large number of citizens, and with the 
three main institutions presided by members of the prime minister 
Rajoy’s political family. The most worrying is that in Madrid some 
have interpreted the EU’s shyness as a blank check for a repressive 
response and, eventually, the suspension of Catalonia’s autonomy 
and of Catalan institutions. 
 On August 1, 2018, Merritxell Serret, the new representative of the Catalonian 
government to the EU, met with the EU’s Minister for Foreign Action, Institutional Relations 
and Transparency. Serret said that “”[t]he main challenge is to bring Catalonia closer to Europe 
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and Europe closer to Catalonia, for there to be mutual respect….We want to contribute to the 
construction of our common project for Europe, a people’s Europe.” According to Serret, “the 
objective of the delegation of Catalonia to the EU is to participate in each and every one of the 
areas affecting citizens, from the future of the Common Agricultural Policy to helping to find 
solutions for the refugees arriving in Europe.” 
 On October 16, 2018, the government of Catalonia filed a formal complaint with the EU 
ombudsman on the Spanish government’s alleged violation of digital rights through the shutting 
down of websites “during the days running up to and following the October 1 referendum last 
year.” (Generalitat de Catalonia Ministry for Foreign Action, Institutional Relations and 
Transparency).  
 These examples of Catalonian activities at the EU show that Catalonia’s EU delegation is 
working toward three objectives: First, it is seeking to establish Catalonia’s role as an integral 
part of the EU and to strengthen Catalonia’s role in European affairs. Second, by becoming 
involved in specific EU programs such as that for agricultural subsidies, the delegation is seeking 
to ensure that Catalonia receives equitable distributions under these programs. Finally, Catalonia 
is using the EU to protect the rights of Catalonia and its citizens in relation to the Spanish state, 
as shown by its protest to the EU ombudsman of an alleged Spanish violation of digital rights.  
 All of these efforts by Catalonia at the EU have the goal of expanding the scope of 
Catalonia’s autonomy. By strengthening Catalonia’s ties with the EU, the Catalonian delegation 
hopes to gain European recognition of the region’s status as a separate actor in Europe with its 
own policy objectives that are entitled to European recognition. By ensuring that Catalonia is 
treated equitably under EU programs such as the agricultural subsidy program, Catalonia’s 
delegation is attempting to improve the financial situation of the region and the individual 
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finances of its citizens. By protesting alleged Spanish abuses, the delegation is seeking to use EU 
institutions to protect its autonomy. Through all of these activities, Catalonia’s position within 
the EU in the past two years has been that of a national government with interests that are 
independent from those the Spanish state. By asserting this position of national separateness 
Catalonia is seeking to advance EU recognition of the independent national status that its 
government is now claiming.     
Despite Catalonia’s paradiplomatic efforts at the EU, the EU’s top officials have 
responded to Catalonia’s independence efforts in a negative manner and sided entirely with the 
Spanish state’s position. On October 27, 2017, the President of the European Council Donald 
Tusk stated that: “For EU nothing changes. Spain remains our only interlocutor. I hope the 
Spanish government favors force of argument, not argument of force” (Saeed). 
European Parliament President Antonio Tajani said that “no one in the EU is going to 
recognize this declaration [of independence from Spain]” (Saeed). 
The Commission issued an official statement that the “[independence] vote in Catalonia 
was not legal” and that “this is an internal matter for Spain that has to be dealt with in line with 
the constitutional order of Spain.” The Commission declared that “[if] a referendum were to be 
organized in line with the Spanish Constitution it would mean that the territory leaving would 
find itself outside of the EU.”  
Further, the Commission stated that: “Beyond the purely legal aspects of this matter, the 
Commission believes that these are times for unity and stability, not divisiveness and 
fragmentation. We call on all relevant players to now move very swiftly from confrontation to 
dialogue. Violence can never be an instrument in politics. We trust the leadership of Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy to manage this difficult process in full respect to he Spanish 
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Constitution and of the fundamental rights of citizens enshrined therein” (Statement on the 
events in Catalonia). 
 Speaking at the university in the Spanish city of Salamanca, Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker said on November 9, 2017 that “[n]ationalisms are a form of poison that prevent 
Europe from working together…[and] I say ‘no’ to any form of separatism that weakens Europe 
and further widens the existing fissures” (Saeed).    
 In contrast to these statements against Catalonian independence by top EU officials, there 
have been statements of support for the civic rights of Catalonians by some EU Parliament 
members. On September 17, 2017, Philippe Lamberts, the co-president of the Greens/EFA 
grouping in the European Parliament, wrote a letter to Commission Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans objecting to the arrests of Catalonian government officials, restrictions on public 
debate and political advertising in Catalonia and the intended seizure by the Spanish government 
of Catalonian government accounts (Letter of Philippe Lamberts to Frans Timmermans).   
 On November 3, 2017, a letter was co-signed by 118 members of the European 
Parliament, other politicians, scholars and public intellectuals objecting to the “violation of the 
Rule of Law in Spain” during the Catalonian independence referendum. Although the letter did 
not take sides on the “substance of the dispute on territorial sovereignty” regarding Catalonia, it 
alleged that the EU leadership had “implicitly condoned the actions of the Spanish police” in 
using “violence…as an instrument of politics.” This letter was a call to the EU to intervene in the 
Catalonian independence controversy to the extent of assuring the “Rule of Law” (“Upholding 
the Rule of Law in the EU”).   
 On March 28, 2018, François Alfonsi, the president of the Greens/European Free 
Alliance (EFA) grouping in the European Parliament, wrote a letter addressed to the presidents 
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of the Council of the EU, Commission, and European Parliament, stating that the prosecutions of 
Catalonian governmental leaders by the Spanish government “puts basic European values at 
stake.” The letter “[called] upon the EU…and its Member States to demand Spain to refrain from 
further repressive actions and to stop regression in democratic and civic rights and to engage in 
constructive dialogue” (Alfonsi letter of 28 Mar 2018).   
 On April 23, 2018, Stefano Grassi responded to the above letter on behalf of Commission 
President Juncker. He wrote that “we have taken note of its contents with attention” and that the 
letter had been transmitted to Vèra Jourová, the Commission member responsible for Justice, 
Consumers and Gender Equality, who “is looking into the points you have raised and will 
respond to you rapidly.” (Jiménez). Jourová’s response, if any, has not been located. 
 Although none of the letters addressed by EU parliamentarians to top EU officials go so 
far as to support the substantive rights of Catalonia to independence, they all insist that Spain 
must follow legal procedures and avoid the use of suppressive tactics and violence in dealing 
with the Catalonian independence movement. They are expressions of support for the right of 
Catalonians to use the peaceful methods of referendum and parliamentary action in seeking 
independence from Spain. As such, these letters constitute activities within the EU on behalf of 
increased Catalonian autonomy.        
 Summary: The government of Catalonia has persisted in seeking greater autonomy in the 
face of continued opposition from the Spanish state. Since the date of the Lisbon treaty, Spain 
has not consented to any expansions of Catalonia’s autonomy. In 2010, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court actually reduced the region’s fiscal ability by declaring as unconstitutional 
the provision in the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia allowing the region to collect its own 
taxes. This decision began the transformation of Catalonia’s original efforts for increased 
70 
 
autonomy within into a struggle for national independence. This struggle is ongoing and is facing 
a harsh response from the Spanish government through the jailing and criminal prosecutions of 
Catalonian government leaders.   
 The Catalonian delegation to the EU has worked diligently within EU institutions to 
expand the scope of its autonomy. These efforts have not brought the region any success. On the 
contrary, the EU has taken a hard line against the Catalonian independence referendum and its 
declaration of independence, and has sided entirely with the Spanish state. Letters to top EU 
officials by EU parliamentarians and the Greens/EFA parliamentary grouping on behalf of the 
civil rights of Catalonians have likewise achieved no change in the EU position on this issue.  
 Catalonia is thus a prime example of a region in which there has been EU activity on 
behalf of greater autonomy but whose efforts at greater autonomy are opposed by the national 
government.      
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CHAPTER 9: SCOTLAND 
Historical background: England and Scotland today form two parts of the United 
Kingdom (UK) that also includes Wales and Northern Ireland. Relations between the UK and 
Scotland continue to be governed by the 1707 Acts of Union. This is considered to have no 
higher status under UK law than any other law, and can be repealed by the UK parliament. 
(Happold 17-18). The UK parliament in Westminster retains the power to legislate on any matter 
that has been devolved to Scotland but under the “Sewel convention” incorporated into the 
Scotland Law of 2016, the UK parliament has declared that it “will not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish parliament.” The UK House of 
Lords has ruled, however, that the Sewel convention is not enforceable by the judiciary. (“Gina 
Miller case”). 
The beginnings of renewed Scottish autonomy took place in 1997.  In that year, UK 
Prime Minister Tony  Blair initiated a program of “devolution” for Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland. He said that devolution would “lance the boil for independence” (Keating 
213). 
Three laws enacted by the UK parliament have conferred progressively greater autonomy 
on Scotland. The 1998 Scotland Act re-established a Scottish parliament for the first time since 
1707.23 This act contained a list of competences reserved to the UK government. The Scottish 
government had authority to legislative on competences not on the list. The list of reserved 
competences was extensive and included constitutional matters, foreign affairs and defense, 
international development, the Civil Service, financial and economic issues, most energy 
regulation (including electricity, coal, oil and gas, and nuclear energy), transportation into and 
out of Scotland (including air and rail and international shipping), employment, social security, 
                                                23	It is commonly referred to as “Hollyrood” for the Hollyrood area of Edinbugh in which it is located.	
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broadcasting and equal opportunities. Powers devolved to Scotland included health, social work, 
education and training, local government including housing, justice and policing, agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries, the environment, tourism, economic development, and internal transport  
(“Devolution Settlement: Scotland”). The Scottish Government had only very limited revenue-
generating authority under the 1998 Scotland Act even for its devolved powers. Devolved 
revenue (that is, taxes raised by the Scottish government) as a percentage of devolved 
expenditures was only 9%. Devolved revenue as a percentage of total expenditure in Scotland 
(from both the UK and Scottish governments) was 6% (“The Scottish Parliament Citizens’ Guide 
to Scottish Devolution”). The taxes levied by the Scottish government were local taxes on 
property (council tax on property and local business rates) as well as the power to amend the 
income tax rate up or down by up to 3 percent of income (“Devolution of tax powers to the 
Scottish Parliament: the Scotland Act”). 
Scottish autonomy since the Lisbon Treaty. The 2012 Scotland Act gave the Scottish 
government only modest new substantive powers that included drunken driving regulation, a 
national speed limit, and the administration of elections to the Scottish Parliament (The Scottish 
Parliament “The Scotland Act”). The major changes in the 2012 Act related to increases in 
Scottish government’s borrowing and taxing authority. The Scottish government gained the 
power to borrow up to £2.2 billion for capital expenditures and up to £500 million for revenues 
(“The Scottish Parliament Citizens’ Guide to Scottish Devolution”). With respect to taxation, the 
Scottish government gained the authority to impose a landfill tax and a tax on waste disposal 
(“Devolution of tax powers to the Scottish Parliament: the Scotland Act 2012”). Most 
importantly, the 2012 Scotland Act enabled the Scottish government to establish a Scottish rate 
of income tax. UK tax law provided for a “basic” rate of 20%, a “higher” rate of 40%, and an 
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“additional” rate of 45%. The national UK government collected these taxes. For all Scottish 
taxpayers, the 2012 Act reduced these tax rates by 10% of income. Thus, for example, the 20% 
basic rate fell to 10%. Scotland gained the authority to impose its own taxes to supplement the 
national rates (GOV.UK “Guidance Scotland Act 2012”). As a result of the 2012 tax changes, 
total annual taxes collected by the Scottish government more than doubled from £3.870 million 
to £8.630 million. Devolved revenue as a percentage of devolved expenditures rose from 9% to 
21% and devolved revenues as a percentage of total expenditures (from both the UK and Scottish 
governments) rose from 6% to 13% (“Citizens’ Guide to Scottish Devolution: Scotland’s new 
financial powers”).  
The Scotland Act 2016 is the most recent piece of Scottish devolution legislation.  Under 
this legislation, the Scottish government gained powers over the Crown estate (lands owned by 
the monarch), on-shore oil and gas leasing, employment programs for the long-term unemployed 
and disabled, energy efficiency programs, transport, abortion, consumer advocacy and advice, 
equal opportunities, gaming machine licensing, parking, policing of railways, speed limits, and 
traffic signs (“Hollyrood gains new powers under Scotland Act 2016”). It also acquired authority 
to enact 11 new types of social security payments, including disability living allowances, 
“attendance allowances” to help senior citizens continue to live independently, allowances for 
“carers,” winter fuel payments, compensation for industrial injuries, and discretionary housing 
payments (Berry and Kidner; “The Scottish Parliament Citizens’ Guide to Scottish Devolution”).        
Under the Scotland Act 2016, the Scottish government’s capital borrowing authority 
increased from a £2.2 billion to a £3.0 billion limit. The annual limit on resource borrowing 
remained the same at  £600 million per year but an overall limit of £1.75 billion was established. 
A “Scotland Reserve” borrowing of up to £700 million was authorized.  
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The 2016 Scotland Act also significantly increased the taxation powers of the Scottish 
government. Scotland now had complete control over its income tax rates and bands. It gained 
authority to impose an “aggregates levy” on sand, gravel and rock that was dug, dredged or 
imported. It could now impose an air passenger duty. A percentage of the Value Added Tax 
collected by the UK government was now allocated to Scotland24. The Auditor General of 
Scotland estimated that these new taxing powers, taken together, would generate over $17 billion 
in additional annual revenues for the Scottish government. Scottish tax revenues as a percentage 
of devolved expenditures would rise from 21% to 36%25, and tax revenues as a percentage of 
total expenditures in Scotland (by the UK and Scottish governments) would rise from 13% to 
23% (Auditor General for Scotland).  
The 2012 and 2016 Scotland Acts show that the national UK government has been 
willing to devolve greater autonomy to the Scottish government since the time of the Lisbon 
treaty. Even beyond the increased autonomy provided by these two acts, the UK parliament has 
conferred upon the people of Scotland the power to opt for complete independence separation if 
this is their choice as demonstrated by their vote in a referendum on separation. The Scottish 
National Party (SNP) has taken the lead in pressing for Scottish independence. This party bases 
its arguments for independence on Scotland’s long history as an independent until the eighteenth 
century, the continued perception of many Scottish people that they belong to a separate nation, 
and a belief that its development is being curtailed by Westminster. Alex Salmond, the First 
Minister of Scotland from 2007 to 2014, has said that an independent Scotland, with its share of 
the North Sea oil wealth, would become one of the world’s richest countries (Brooks). The 
                                                	
25 This is an estimate of the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee of the Scottish Parliament. The 
Scottish Auditor General has estimated that under the 2016 Scotland Act, 52% of devolved expenditures would be 
paid for out of Scottish revenues (“Scotland’s new financial powers”). 
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beginnings of renewed Scottish autonomy took place in 1997, when the British Labor Party, 
under Prime Minister Tony Blair, took office in Westminster. Blair initiated a program of 
“devolution” for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. He said that devolution would “lance 
the boil for independence” (Keating 213). 
Since the 1980s, the SNP has taken a pro-European position with a slogan of 
“independence in Europe” (Keating 201). In a 2013 document entitled “Scotland’s Future,” the 
Scottish Government led by the SNP expressed support for Scotland’s membership as an 
independent country in the EU (“Scotland’s Future” 03). In contrast to Åland, whose autonomy 
is based on the Swedish character of the islands, the Scottish independence movement has been 
primarily civic rather than ethnic, stressing the independence of the Scottish nation rather than 
the Scots as an ethnic group. It has been written that ‘[t]he Scottish National Party…has been 
quite successful in crafting an image of ‘Scottishness’ that is cosmopolitan and open to diversity” 
(Sanjay et al. 1232).  
Under Schedule 5 of the 1998 Scotland Act, the status of the United Kingdom is a matter 
reserved to the UK Parliament. The Scottish parliament, however, has power to issue a “Section 
30 Order” for an independence referendum. Under the Edinburgh agreement entered into 
between the UK and Scottish governments, the referendum must be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the framework established by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Act of 2000 (Armstrong 186). 
In 2011 elections, the SNP won a majority of seats in the Scottish parliament. The 
Scottish parliament then scheduled an independence referendum that was held on September 18, 
2014. On the question “should Scotland be an independent country?” the “no” vote was 55.3% 
and the “yes” vote was 44.7%. More recent polling shows that support in Scotland for a second 
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independence referendum by 2024 is 66% (Borg-Barthet 414). Scottish First Minister Nicola 
Sturgeon has said that a referendum is a duty where Scottish interests are harmed. Among the 
“red lines” that she said would cause her to ask for a new referendum are withdrawal from 
membership in the single market and protections for EU citizens and Scottish workers. It has 
been reported that British Prime Minister Theresa May would “strongly consider blocking or 
delaying” a second Scottish independence referendum (McCorkindale 360-361). 
Scotland in the EU: Both the people and government of Scotland have been 
overwhelmingly supportive of continued membership in the EU. In the June 23, 2016 UK 
referendum on EU membership, Scottish voters chose to remain in the EU by a margin of 62% in 
favor and 38% opposed. In contrast, 52% of the electorate in the UK as a whole voted to leave 
the EU, with 48% voting in favor of staying (“Scotland in Europe”). The Scottish government 
stated following the Brexit vote that “we believe that remaining in the EU would have been the 
best option for the UK as a whole and for Scotland” (“Scottish Government Policy Europe”). 
One year prior to the Brexit vote, an SNP-led Scottish government publication cited increased 
participation in the EU as a reason that Scotland should seek independence. The publication took 
note that in an independent Scotland, the Scottish First Minister would participate on an equal 
basis in meetings of the European Council. Likewise, the Scottish government would participate 
in meetings of the Council of the EU. At the Committee of Permanent Representatives, Scotland 
could take part “at every level in the EU legislative and policy process.” The number of Scottish 
representatives in the EU Parliament (currently six) could be expected to double, based on the EP 
representation of other EU members with similar populations (“Scotland in the EU”).    
Following the Brexit referendum, the Scottish government has supported an exit deal that 
would provide for the greatest possible continuing involvement of the UK in the EU. On 
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November 15, 2018, Scottish Constitutional Relations Secretary Michael Russell stated that 
“[t]he Scottish Government’s established and evidence-based policy is that, short of staying in 
the EU, remaining in the single Market and Customs Union is the best outcome for Scotland and 
the UK as a whole” (Scottish Government “News Brexit Deal”). The Scottish government has 
declared that even if the UK leaves the single market, Scotland should be allowed to remain in it. 
Furthermore, the Scottish government has sought to “[ensure] that powers ‘repatriated’ from 
Brussels are returned to Scotland, in line with the current devolution settlement, to safeguard 
Scotland’s interests within the UK” (Scottish Government “Policy Europe”).  
Various bodies of the Scottish government specialize in EU issues. In July 2016, the 
Scottish First Minister’s Standing Council on Europe was established. Members of this body 
“will consider the impact of proposed changes to the UK’s relationship with the EU on Scottish 
interests, and advise Ministers throughout our Brexit negotiations on the best way to secure 
Scottish interests and objectives” (Scottish Government “Standing Council on Europe”). Within 
the Scottish parliament, the Culture, Tourism and External Affairs Committee is charged with 
considering the “[implications of the EU referendum on Scotland” as well as “EU legislation 
[and] European Communities or EU issues” (Scottish Parliament Culture, Tourism and External 
Affairs Committee).   
The Brexit negotiations have been a source of tension between the UK and Scottish 
governments. To help deal with issues of devolution, the UK government in 1999 established the 
Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). This committee consists of ministers from the UK and the 
devolved governments (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). Two subcommittees of the 
JMC—JMC Europe and JMC Europe negotiations—deal with relations between the UK and EU 
(“Devolution and the Joint Ministerial Committee”). The Scottish government has expressed 
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dissatisfaction with Scotland’s limited role within the JMC in relation to European matters. On 
February 6, 2018, Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon wrote to UK Prime Minister Teresa 
May that “[we] have been frustrated that discussions in the JMC (EN) have fallen short of the 
original aim of the committee and of the Prime Minister’s own commitment to ‘full involvement’ 
of the devolved administrations. However, we continue to engage in this forum and remain 
committed to improving dialogue between the administrations, to influence the shape of the UK 
approach and objectives for negotiations” (Scottish Government “Call for more engagement on 
Brexit”). In response to First Minister Sturgeon’s criticisms of the JMC process, the UK 
government established a Ministerial Forum which “will sit beneath and complement 
engagement at the JMC (EN) (Scottish Government “Policy Europe EU negotiations”). 
Scotland’s desire for a continuing, close engagement with the EU is the key for 
understanding its activities within the EU. Scotland actively participates in EU affairs. Scotland 
House in Brussels is the geographic base of Scotland’s EU activities. Scotland House has 
partnered with the Scottish government as well as two private organizations that promote 
Scottish interests: Scotland Europa (a membership-based organization which includes Scottish 
universities, businesses, and civic organizations) and Scottish Enterprise/Scottish Development 
International (Scotland Europa Scotland House). In 2017 and 2018, Scotland House hosted 
several events focusing on Scotland’s role in Europe. These included forums on sustainable 
energy transition, methods for enhancing innovation in rural areas, Scotland’s collaborative place 
in Europe with a focus on science and innovation, the economic importance of sporting and 
cultural events, the importance of civil society, elderly health care, a young peoples’ conclave in 
which the participants exchanged ideas on the future of Europe, and a panel discussion hosted by 
the Scottish Secretary for Culture, Tourism and External Affairs on the document “Scotland’s 
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Place in Europe” written by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. There was also a fisheries reception, 
a showcasing of Scotland’s culinary heritage, and a “Burns supper” in commemoration of the 
Scottish poet Robert Burns. What all of these events have in common is that they represent 
efforts to integrate Scotland within European society in a broad range of endeavors that include 
economic development and innovation, civic engagement, and cultural life (“Scottish 
Government events in Brussels 2018”; “Scottish Government events in Brussels 2017”).   
As well as the Scotland House events described above, Scottish government ministers 
make visits to the EU headquarters in Brussels on a regular basis. In 2018, for example, Scottish 
ministers made the following visits:   
• Paul Wheelhouse, Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy, held a series of round-
table discussions on energy efficiency and renewable energy in which he “expressed his 
commitment to working with European partners.” 
• First Minister Nicola Sturgeon met with the EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier. She 
also “hosted a round table discussion with representatives of think tanks and the business 
community in Brussels” and officially reopened the refurbished Brussels House. 
• The Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Tourism, and External Affairs held a policy seminar 
entitled “a sporting legacy-contributing to Europe’s competitiveness in a global 
marketplace.” 
• The Minister for Further Education, Higher Education and Science set forth Scotland’s 
position on the “Framework Program 9” (relating to digital technologies and skills). He 
also participated in events dealing with jobs, investment, and innovation and hosted an 
event on “Scotland’s collaborative place in Europe.” 
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• The Scottish Lord Advocate made a presentation on “Tackling Transnational Crime: A 
Scottish perspective.” 
• The Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Tourism, and External Affairs hosted the annual 
Burns supper at Scotland House and “promoted the Scottish government’s message and 
key messages set out in ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe: People, Jobs and Investment” 
(“Ministerial visits within Europe 2018”).  
What all of the Scotland House events and ministerial visits to Brussels have in common is 
that they are outreach efforts by the government of Scotland to promote Scotland’s continuing 
integral place within Europe. Whether they address business innovations, cultural and sporting 
matters, or civic engagement, these conferences and addresses by Scottish officials all express a 
position supportive of a close relationship between Scotland and the EU. As far as the present 
research has determined, in none of these events have Scottish government representatives or 
private Scottish organizations sought to use EU institutions as a mechanism to promote greater 
Scottish autonomy within the UK.   
Summary: The national government of the UK has supported a progressive strengthening of 
Scottish autonomy that has been accomplished by means of successive UK parliamentary acts. 
The UK government has even been willing to accept a complete separation of Scotland from the 
UK if this action is supported by the results of a regional referendum. Unlike Åland, Scotland 
takes an active role in EU affairs. An examination of recent Scottish activities within the EU, 
however, shows that Scotland is not using EU institutions to promote its regional autonomy. 
Rather, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, the Scottish government and private Scottish 
organizations such as Scotland Europa are trying to strengthen Scotland’s ties to the EU in 
diverse areas that include business, technology, cultural life, and civic affairs. Scotland is not 
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using the EU to weaken its relationship with the rest of the UK but rather to maintain and 
strengthen its European role. Scotland is thus a prime example of a region in which the central 
government has supported greater autonomy and the region does not seek to promote its 
autonomy within EU institutions.  
 An examination of the Scotland Acts of 2012 and 2016 shows that Scotland has 
succeeded in raising the level of its autonomy by increasing its fiscal ability. The region’s taxing 
and borrowing powers have greatly increased under these acts, and Scottish revenues account for 
an increasing percentage of Scottish government expenditures. The list of competences within 
Scottish control has grown across the entire spectrum of government activities.      
 Scotland is thus an example of a region that has achieved greater autonomy with the 
support of the nation state in the absence of EU activity on behalf of this increase in autonomy. 
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CHAPTER 10: FLANDERS 
Historical background:  Flanders is the northern, Dutch-speaking portion of the Kingdom 
of Belgium. When Belgium gained recognition as a separate nation in 1830, it became a unitary 
state without a regional delegation of powers. This began to change in 1970 with the first of what 
were to be six “State Reforms,” each of which gave the Flemish part of the country progressively 
greater levels of autonomy. 
   Under the Belgian Constitution, all regional delegations of power must be approved by 
the national legislature as constitutional amendments. Constitutional amendments require two-
thirds majorities of each major linguistic group (French and Dutch) in both houses of the national 
parliament, the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, with two-thirds of the members the 
members of each chamber being present (Goossens and Cannoot E-32). Through this 
constitutional process, each increase in the autonomy of Flanders has gained the formal 
endorsement of the Belgian government. 
 The First State Reform of 1970 established Flemish and French “cultural communities” 
as well as a smaller German cultural community in the southeast of Belgium. Under the Second 
State Reform of 1980, the cultural communities were renamed simply “communities.” Each 
community had a separate legislative council and government. The communities acquired 
jurisdiction over health care and social services. The 1980 law also created a Flemish region and 
a Walloon region, each of which also were granted a council and government. The basic concept 
was that the communities would have jurisdiction over delegated competences affecting the 
person, while the regions would have jurisdiction over delegated competences involving 
territory. In keeping with this distinction, the regions had distinct geographic boundaries whereas 
the communities’ membership was based on linguistic affiliations. A basic asymmetry between 
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Flemish and Walloon autonomy was the result of geography. The Flemish region was 
geographically contiguous. The French part of the country, however, was divided into two 
separate parts, Wallonia and the Brussels-Capital area. Brussels, where over 85% of the 
inhabitants speak French as their first language, is a linguistic island surrounded by Dutch 
speakers. 
As a result of these asymmetries, Flemish autonomy took a different path than the 
autonomy of the French-speaking areas. Almost immediately following the Second State 
Reform, the Flemish Community and Region merged into a single government. In the French-
speaking part of the country, the region and community remained separate.  
The Third State Reform of 1988-1989 established the Brussels-Capital area as a third, 
separate region. Until this time, the inhabitants of Brussels had not belonged to a region. 
Additionally, the Third State Reform increased the powers of all of the communities by giving 
them competence in education (a person-based competence) and increased the powers of the 
regions by giving them competence transport and public works (a territory-based competence). 
The Fourth State Reform of 1993 fundamentally changed the Belgian state into its 
present federal form which is unique in the world. The first clause of the first article of the 
Belgian constitution had formerly provided that “Belgium is divided into provinces.” This clause 
was amended to state that “Belgium is a federal state which consists of communities and 
regions.” For the first time, all of the members of the regional and community legislatures were 
democratically elected. The Fourth State Reform established a principle of equality between the 
national government and the governments of the communities and regions. The national, 
regional, and community governments each had sole jurisdiction over areas of government that 
had been allocated to them. There was supposed to be no overlap in functions, although there 
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could be differing opinions as to which governmental unit exercised competence over a 
particular program. This is in contrast to a federal system such as that of the United States, in 
which different levels of government (national, state, and local) may all have the power to enact 
laws in the same subject areas (for example, education), and there is a hierarchy of powers 
between the different levels of government, with the federal judiciary having the power to 
overturn state that conflict with federal statutes or violate the federal constitution.  
The entire Belgian federal structure has been described as a “consociational democracy.”  
In this form of government, “sharing power between segmental elites, instead of excluding 
minorities from power, is what turns centrifugal forces into constructive forces for democratic 
stability” (Romainville 233). There are some limits, however, on the political equality generally 
enjoyed by the regions and communities. Under the so-called “alarm bell procedure,” decision-
making authority is transferred to the national Council of Ministers “whenever a linguistic group 
of the Federal Parliament or of the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital region considers that its 
rights are or will be infringed” (Romainville 233). 
There are frequently uncertainties as to which Belgian governmental unit has control over 
a particular governmental program. These issues of jurisdiction are usually resolved through 
inter-governmental conferences. A variety of bodies have been established to conduct these 
inter-governmental gatherings. The “Consultation Committee” includes the Belgian Prime 
Minister and the Minister Presidents of the regions and communities. There are also working 
groups in specific areas, for example, a working group for European affairs (Criekemans 8). A 
National Court of Arbitration can annul legislation that violates the division of powers, and a 
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Council of State “advises on the constitutionality of legislation and can rule administrative acts 
unconstitutional” (“Division of Powers Belgium”).26 
Since the Fourth State Reform, the powers of the regional and community governments 
have extended to foreign affairs. The legal principle applicable here is “in foro interno, in foro 
externo.”  This means that “if a Belgian regional government is competent internally for a 
material domain, then it also automatically becomes competent externally” (Criekemans 2). 
Under the principle of inforo interno, in foro externo, the Belgian regions and communities have 
the ability to “send their own diplomatic representatives and to conclude international treaties 
with third parties” (Criekemans 2). Examples of such international diplomacy are the treaties that 
Flanders has entered into with Poland, Hungary and the Baltic States (Criekemans 20). When a 
foreign policy issue affects the competences of more than one government, the affected 
governments need to reach agreement on their joint position (Criekemans 6). 
The Fifth State Reform was enacted in 2001. Among its many provisions, this reform 
transferred additional powers to the regions including those concerning agriculture, fisheries, 
foreign trade, auditing of financing expenses and supplementary financing of the political parties. 
The reform also granted the regions the authority to levy a small surcharge or allow a small 
deduction on federal income taxes (Swendon 8).  
Flemish autonomy since the Lisbon treaty: The expansion of Flemish autonomy 
continued with the Sixth State Reform of 2012-2014. This reform substantially increased the 
                                                
26 To add to the complexity of the Belgian federal system, there are provinces and communes whose 
powers are described by the Belgian government as “extensive.” According to the Belgian government, “[i]n theory, 
a commune can do anything that it is not prohibited from doing….[the communes] are mainly charged with the 
police forces, maintaining the registers of births, deaths and marriages, plus the registers of the population” (“The 
powers of the communes”). The provinces “have devised initiatives in the fields of education, social and cultural 
infrastructures, preventive medicine and social policy. They also deal with the environment, highways and 
waterways, the economy, transport, public works, housing, use of official languages, etc.”. The provinces exercise 
their authority under the supervision of a community, region, or the national government, depending on the area of 
governance (“The powers of the provinces”).   		
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fiscal ability of the regions. Until the enactment of this latest reform, the Belgian fiscal system 
financed the regions and communities in the following way: The regions and communities were 
not limited by the national government in their expenditures (“Division of Powers Belgium”). 
Financing for the regional and community governments came mainly from the national 
government. Regions and communities received a share of personal income tax revenues. The 
total pool of personal tax revenues available to the regions was indexed from a 1989 base figure 
according to inflation and economic growth (Spahn 9). The amount of money which each region 
and community received from the pool was proportional to the personal income taxes collected 
from that region or community (Spahn 8). In addition, the national government paid an 
“equalization grant” to the poorer regions (Spahn 9-10). 
The regions also had the ability to collect certain taxes other than income taxes. These 
included property taxes, taxes on amusement devices and gambling, motor vehicle taxes and 
registration fees (Spahn 13). It was estimated that as of 2003, the taxes raised by the regions 
themselves amounted to only 10 to 15 percent of their expenditures (Swendon 8). 
 Besides their receipt of a share of the personal income tax, the communities also 
received a share of value-added tax (VAT) revenues. The amount of VAT money that each 
community region received was based on the resident population of school age (Spahn 15).  
The Sixth State Reform left the above system in place but increased the fiscal ability of 
the regions by allowing them to levy unlimited surcharges on the personal income tax. 
Additionally, a region could increase or decrease the basic tax rate on the taxes used to finance 
the region’s competences. The regional surcharges and tax increases allowed by this new law 
became the “regional personal income tax” that had not existed before (Goossens and Cannoot 
E-42). 
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Under the Sixth State Reform there was also a significant transfer of substantive 
governmental powers to the regions. Important portions of labor market policy and road safety 
were transferred to the regions, and tourism was almost entirely transferred to them (Goossens 
and Cannoot E-45). 
The communities did not receive increased fiscal ability under the Sixth State Reform but 
they received new substantive powers in the areas of family benefits, care for the elderly and 
health care (Goossens and Cannoot E-42). Both the regions and communities became responsible 
to pay a greater share of pension costs beginning in 2016. Their contributions for the public 
financing of the State and the cost of caring for the elderly also increased (Goossens and Cannoot  
E-45). 
The Sixth State Reform increased the proportional share of regional and community 
government expenditures. Before the Sixth State reform, it was estimated that regional and 
community expenditures, taken together, amounted to 28% of total government expenditures 
among all Belgian government units (this total includes the expenditures of the national 
government, communes and provinces, as well as the regions and communities). Once the Sixth 
State Reform took full effect in 2015, it was estimated that regional and community 
expenditures, taken together, amounted to over 30% of total expenditures (“Division of Powers 
Belgium”). ”Revenue autonomy” is defined as a governmental unit’s own revenues compared to 
the total revenues available. The Belgian regions’ revenue autonomy is now estimated at 
approximately 25 percent. This is a considerable increase from the 10 to 15 percent revenue 
autonomy that was estimated in 2003 (“Division of Powers Belgium”).   
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After the Sixth State Reform, “[t]he Flemish budget has now indeed become larger than 
the federal budget, if one does not take into account the federal power and budget concerning 
social security” (Goossens and Cannoot E-45).   
 The extensive devolution of powers to the regions and communities27 has forced the 
national government, regions, and communities to cooperate closely in what has become a 
fragmented power structure in which “[t]he transfers of powers are very detailed and often 
include exceptions” (Goossens and Cannoot E-45). 
 Despite the extensive powers devolved to the combined Flemish regional and community 
government, there exists substantial popular support in Flanders for complete separation from the 
Belgian state. There are two Flemish political parties seeking regional independence. The smaller 
of these in terms of its support is Vlaams Belang, a party with fascist roots but which now 
describes itself as “a nationalist party on the right committed to achieving independence for 
Flanders with Brussels as its capital” (Erk 494). 28  
The New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie or N-VA) has been described as a 
“nationalist, conservative, and separatist political movement striving for an independent Flemish 
state” (Rosetti). It is considered a more moderate party than Vlaams Belang. N-VA is currently 
the largest party in the Flemish Parliament, holding 43 out of 124 parliamentary seats. In the 
Flanders elections of 2014, N-VA received 31.88% of the vote (Maly 266). This high vote total 
                                                
27 The powers still reserved to the national government after the Sixth State Reform consist of: 
[T]he judicial system, the army, the federal police, social security and the important 
laws in the field of social security (unemployment, pensions, child benefit, health 
insurance), public debt, monetary policy, prices and incomes policy, protection of 
savings, nuclear energy, State-owned companies (such as Belgian Railways, the Post 
Office), the federal scientific and cultural institutions, etc. Furthermore, the Federal 
State is responsible for the obligations of Belgium and its federalised institutions 
towards the EU or NATO. (“The Federal Government’s powers”). 	
28 Vlaams Belang is the successor party to Vlaams Blok, which disbanded in 2004 after the Court of Cassation ruled 
that it stood in violation of the law against racism (Erk 494). Vlaams Belang currently holds 6 seats in the 124-
member Flemish Parliament.  	
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shows that despite Flanders’ very high level of autonomy, there is strong popular support in 
Flanders for complete separation from the Belgian state. The independence of Flanders from 
Belgian, however, would require the complete scrapping of all of the elaborate constitutional 
arrangements that have been developed between Flanders and the national government since 
1970 under the six state reforms.  
 Flanders in the EU: At the time of the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the Kingdom of 
Belgium issued Declaration 51 in relation to its activities at the EU.  This declaration stated that: 
The Kingdom of Belgium wishes to make clear that, in accordance with its 
constitutional law, not only the Chamber of Representatives and Senate of the 
Federal Parliament but also the parliamentary assemblies of the Communities 
and the Regions act, in terms of the competences exercised by the Union, as 
components of the national parliamentary system or chambers of the national 
Parliament.   
Flanders is extensively involved in the EU through the General Representation of 
Flanders to the EU (“General Representation of the Government of Flanders to the EU”). The 
Flemish representation at the EU is “in close contact with the European institutions, the members 
of the Government of Flanders and their staff and the Flemish administration. The 
Representation also cooperates with the Liaison Agency Flanders-Europe (Vleva), whose 
mission is to get Flemish civil society and local authorities involved in European matters” 
(“General Representation of the Government of Flanders to the EU”). One of the EU institutions 
in which Flanders is actively involved is REGLEG, the group of EU regions with legislative 
powers (Criekemans 24). The Flemish minister responsible for foreign policy plays a liaison role 
90 
 
by keeping the Flemish Parliament and Government informed about EU developments (“General 
Representation of the Government of Flanders to the EU”).   
To service its extensive EU activities, Flanders has a large permanent EU staff. In 
addition to a General Representative and Deputy General Representative of the Government of 
Flanders, there is a General Economic Representative and 19 specialized policy officers 
(“General Representation of the Government of Flanders to the EU”).  
In its dealings with the EU, Belgian applies the principle of in foro interno, in foro 
externo. Communities and regions have the same competences at the EU as they do internally. 
As explained by the government of Flanders: 
Since the Maastricht Treaty (1992), it is possible – partly because 
Belgium and Flanders insisted – for Ministers from federated 
states to represent their Member State in the Council of Ministers. 
Arrangements regarding the representation of Belgium in the 
Council are laid down in an internal Belgian cooperation 
agreement between the different competent authorities. This 
cooperation agreement sets forth the manner in which Belgian 
positions in the Council must be adopted, ensures a democratic 
basis, and establishes a connection between the EU and the 
Flemish policy levels (“Flanders and the EU”). 
The 1994 cooperation agreement breaks down policy areas into six categories with 
respect to representation in the Council of the EU. In Category I policy areas, the federal 
(national) government has exclusive representation. These areas include foreign affairs, 
economic and financial affairs, justice and home affairs, budget, telecommunications, civil 
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protection and consumer protection. In Category II policy areas, there is federal representation 
with an assessor from the “federated entities” (regions and communities) providing assistance.  
These include transport, energy, domestic market, employment and social affairs, and public 
health. In Category III policy areas, there is “empowerment of the federated entities with a 
federal assessor.” These include industry, research, and the environment. In Category IV policy 
areas, there is exclusive representation of the federated entities. These include culture and audio-
visual affairs, education, youth, sport, tourism, spatial planning, housing, and regional policy. 
The Category V policy area of fisheries is exclusively represented by Flanders. In Category VI, 
which applies only to agriculture, there is federal representation with assistance from the regions. 
Except in agriculture, the regional and community representatives to the EU serve on a rotating 
basis. A representative from a particular region or community represents all of the regions or 
communities in a particular policy area for six months and is then replaced by a representative 
from another region or community. The representatives express the unified regional or 
community position on the issue as it has been previously negotiated (“Coordination of the 
European Policy and the Representation of Belgium”). 
The specific policy issues before the EU to which the government of Flanders assigns 
priority are the following:  
• Brexit;  
• EU agenda for implementing the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals; 
• European semester (“[aligning] the fiscal, macroeconomic and socio-economic policies 
(Europe 2020) of the EU member states);  
• Multiannual financial framework for the period 2021-2027; 
• European Trade Agreements; and 
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• Minimum quality requirements for reused water  
(“General Representation of the Government of Flanders to the EU”). 
 What all of these priority issues have in common is that they have a major impact on the 
economy and quality of life in Flanders, while also being issues of concern to all of Europe. With 
respect to the key EU issue of Brexit, for example, the Flemish government points out that “the 
impact of Brexit on Flanders will be significant” (“General Representation of the Government of 
Flanders to the EU”). The Flemish government says of its involvement in European affairs that:   
In order to help shape …European policy cooperation, we require a 
strong European awareness throughout the Flemish administration. 
Only then, Flanders will be able to have an impact on the EU 
agenda…a strong Flanders in a strong Europe….that is our mission, 
because a strong EU and a solid economic base are vital to protect 
the prosperity and welfare of all (“General Representation of the 
Government of Flanders to the EU”). 
 In general, the government of Flanders views its diplomatic efforts within the EU as an 
indispensable part of a continuing devolution of national governmental powers to the region.  
According to the Flemish government: 
Almost every European decision has either a direct or indirect 
impact on Flemish citizens. This continues to grow as a direct result 
of the ongoing devolution of political power from the federal state to 
the regions and communities of Belgium. Monitoring and 
influencing European decisions are key to the future of the region 
93 
 
(“General Representation of the Government of Flanders to the 
EU”).  
 What the above statement does not mention is that active EU involvement by Flanders is 
necessary to allow Flanders to continue to influence competences that have been transferred 
through EU legislation to the European level. Notable among these competences are those 
relating to the environment and agriculture that the Belgian nation state has devolved to the 
regions. Thus, Flanders’ active involvement in EU affairs serves in part as a defensive measure 
to limit reductions in the scope of its autonomy caused by Europeanization.       
 Beyers and Bursens argue that the need for the regions and communities to reach a 
coordinated position on policy issues before the Council of the EU gives the national government 
an important “gatekeeper” function. According to these authors, “the most important body in the 
coordination process is the Directorate European Affairs (DEA) within the federal [national] 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs…[i]n sum, the 1994 Cooperation Agreement makes the federal 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs a crucial player, because it is the central arena for coordination 
meetings and because all meetings are prepared and chaired by federal administrative and 
political officials.” Thus, Flanders’ diplomatic efforts in the EU may have the double effect of 
not only helping to strengthen the region’s autonomy but also conferring a new and important 
role on the national government (Beyers and Bursens 1064-1065).    
 Summary: Through a continuing process of devolution that began in 1970 and has 
continued since the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, Flanders has transformed from a part of a unified 
Belgian state into an autonomous region with very extensive autonomy. This devolution has been 
accomplished through a series of constitutional amendments known as State Reforms that have 
been enacted by the Belgian Parliament. Under the unique form of Belgian federalism, the 
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Flemish region and community (which have consolidated into a single government) have sole 
competence in all areas of governance that have been delegated to them. Most recently, Flanders’ 
fiscal ability has been significantly strengthened by the Sixth State Reform of 2012-2014. 
 Flanders plays a very active role in EU affairs. Within the Council of the EU, the regions 
and communities represent the Belgian government in areas within their competences. The 
Flemish government views its participation in the EU as an important means to preserve and 
strengthen its autonomy. The transfer of many regional competences to the EU makes Flanders’ 
EU participation essential to avoid a reduction in its policymaking powers in those competences. 
Flanders prioritizes issues before the EU that will increase its influence in European affairs. 
 Flanders is thus an example of a region for which the nation state has supported greater 
autonomy, and which has also worked within EU institutions to strengthen and expand that 
autonomy. Ruling over a territory whose French and Dutch components had differing interests 
and had evolved separate political structures even before the national government began to 
devolve its powers, Belgium has been able to craft a federal system that places its regions and 
linguistic communities at a level of near-equality to the national government by giving them 
authority over a large number and variety of competences. Transfers of fiscal ability to the 
regions have been so significant that regional budgets now exceed those of the national 
government except for debt repayments. But problems have arisen because of the great 
complexity of the federal system that has been created. There are frequent uncertainties as to 
which level of government—national, regional or community—has competence over a particular 
governmental program or part of a program, and an elaborate system of intergovernmental 
conferences has evolved to try to resolve these issues when they arise. Despite the ingenuity that 
has gone into creating the Belgian federal system, the results of the latest election in Flanders 
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show that parties seeking full national separation remain very strong. These election results 
indicate that the question of whether Belgium will remain a single nation state or will eventually 
break into parts has not been resolved. Whether the nation state of Belgium will ultimately 
support full national separation for Belgium cannot be known from the evidence presented here. 
 In summary, Flanders is a region for which the nation state has supported progressive 
increases in autonomy and in which there is extensive activity within EU institutions on behalf of 
that autonomy.    
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CHAPTER 11: DISCUSSION 
This comparative case analysis of four autonomous regions within the EU supports H1, 
which hypothesizes that the success of a regional autonomy movement depends on the position 
of the nation state towards that autonomy. The analysis contradicts H2, which hypothesizes that 
the success of a regional autonomy movement depends on activities within the EU in support of 
that autonomy.  
In three of the four regions studied, the national governments have taken consistent 
positions in supporting or opposing greater autonomy. The Spanish government has continued its 
opposition to greater autonomy for Catalonia and has consistently refused to grant the region 
greater fiscal ability since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The governments of the United 
Kingdom and of Belgium, on the other hand, have accepted progressively more expansive 
autonomy arrangements for Scotland and Flanders, respectively. In the case of Scotland, the 
United Kingdom’s Westminster Parliament has enacted a series of laws beginning in the late 
1990s, each of which gives Scotland a greater level of fiscal ability, and has even accepted an 
independence referendum. Since 1970, Belgium has transformed itself from a unitary to a federal 
state, and the Flanders region and community, which have unified as a single government, have 
gained one of the most extensive autonomies in the world with extensive primary competences in 
widespread areas of governance and the ability to enter into international treaties and represent 
Belgium before international bodies such as the EU when those competences are addressed.  
The one region studied where the attitude of the nation state towards greater regional 
autonomy appears to have changed is Åland. Before 2009, the Finnish Parliament enacted 
successive statutes of autonomy that gave progressively greater autonomy to the region. But 
since 2009, the beginning date for evidence collected in this study, Finland has opposed further 
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expansion of Åland’s autonomy. This sequence of events shows that the stronger EU that 
emerged after the Lisbon Treaty has not facilitated greater regional autonomy for Åland.   
With reference to the typology matrix in the hypothesis section above, Flanders and 
Scotland, the two regions where autonomy movements have succeeded under the criteria 
developed in this thesis, lie in the two upper boxes. Catalonia and Åland, the two regions where 
autonomy movements have not been successful, lie in the two lower boxes. This placement is 
consistent with H1, as the upper boxes represent regions where the nation state supports 
autonomy movements and the lower boxes represent regions where the nation state opposes 
them. The placement is inconsistent with H2, however. The left boxes indicate regions where EU 
activity takes place on behalf of an autonomy movement. In the upper left box (Flanders), the 
autonomy movement has succeeded and in the lower left box (Catalonia) it has not succeeded. 
The right boxes indicate regions where there has not been EU activity on behalf of an autonomy 
movement. In the upper right box (Scotland), the autonomy movement has succeeded and in the 
lower right box (Åland), it has not succeeded.        
The historical approach used in comparing these four regions makes possible a more 
confident analysis as to a national government’s position towards regional autonomy because it 
is based on the pattern of actions of the national government over time. Such confidence would 
not be achieved if particular decisions of the national government were analyzed outside of any 
historical context, as it would then not be possible to determine whether the particular evidence 
selected, taken out of any context, were representative of the totality of the national 
government’s postion. When, however, a wide variety of governmentally based evidence leads to 
the conclusion that a national government has acted in a consistent fashion towards an autonomy 
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movement over a sweep of many years, a much higher level of certainty can be reached on this 
issue.  
This value of such an historically based approach applies even in relation to Finland and 
Åland, where two historical intervals can be distinguished, one period lasting from the 1950s 
until at least the early 1990s, when the Finnish government was willing to grant greater 
autonomy to the region, and the last decade in which Finland has appeared to reverse its position. 
During this last period, Finland has taken a consistent position against granting greater autonomy 
that is reflected in the evidence presented here. 
With respect to EU activities on behalf of a region’s autonomy, the focus here has been 
on detail, concentrating on specific actions of the regional governments in Brussels both within 
and outside the EU institutions. Listings of these activities were deemed to be an effective way 
of determining whether the region had a paradiplomatic strategy of using its participation within 
the EU to promote its autonomy. In addition, actions of EU institutions and officials relating to a 
regional autonomy were considered where they existed. In the case of Catalonia, these actions 
consisted of condemnations of the national separation movement by top EU officials. In the case 
of Flanders, the Flemish government directly participated in the consideration of legislation by 
the Council of the EU that had an impact on Flanders’ complicated autonomy scheme. For Åland 
and Scotland, there were no such EU actions to report.  
Using the methods of analysis employed in the present study, it has been possible to 
conclude that for the regions studied, the critical factors in determining whether the region 
succeeds in strengthening its autonomy are the actions of the respective national governments 
rather than activities within the EU. The contrasting examples of Catalonia and Flanders indicate 
that EU participation is not a determining factor for the success of an autonomy movement. Both 
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Catalonia and Flanders have vigorously participated in EU activities but with completely 
different results. Within EU bodies, Catalonia has sought to assert its status as a region that 
should be deemed as a separate national entity with its own interest and standing apart from 
Spain, The Spanish state, however, has not lessened its total opposition to greater Catalonian 
autonomy in response to these Catalonian paradiplomatic efforts and top EU officials have 
shown a total lack of support for Catalonia’s efforts towards national separation.  
Flanders has likewise used EU institutions to seek to develop its autonomy. In areas 
where Flanders holds national competence, Flanders is entitled to represent the Belgian state in 
the Council of the EU with the prior consultation of the other Belgian regions and communities. 
The Flemish government states that its activities in the Council have the goal of monitoring and 
influencing EU decisions and policies so that they coordinate with the region’s increasingly 
devolved powers. Flanders can achieve these results in the Council because it has the full support 
and coordination of the nation state that is actually written into Belgium’s constitution as it has 
been amended.   
In both Catalonia and Flanders, there is no indication based on the evidence compiled 
that EU activity has had any impact on the consistent, long-term position of the nation state 
either for or against increased regional autonomy. This is a surprising conclusion for two 
reasons.  First, the EU’s well developed, three-tier structure gives an institutional voice to 
regions that could be expected to influence the policies of nations that are EU members. Second, 
the transfer of a large number of competences away from the national level to the European level 
can reasonably lead one to expect a growth in EU influence at the expense of national 
governments. But the evidence compiled here indicates that with regard to autonomy issues, 
Europe basically still functions as it did in the era of nation states before the emergence of the 
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EU as a supra-national body. As a practical matter, autonomy movements therefore can be most 
effective by focusing their efforts at the national rather than at the EU level.  
In the two regions studied that have not made use of EU institutions to promote their 
autonomies, the position of the nation state again is shown to be the critical factor in determining 
whether the level of autonomy increases. As already noted, since at least the time of the signing 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the position of the Finnish government towards the granting of increased 
autonomous powers to Äland has changed from one of support to one of opposition. Åland has 
not raised the issue of its autonomy within EU bodies nor has the EU considered this matter on 
its own. The change in position of the Finnish government concerning Åland’s autonomous 
status was one taken entirely at the national level.   
Scotland, likewise, has not attempted to use the EU to influence the policy of the United 
Kingdom with respect to its autonomy but has nevertheless succeeded in vastly increasing the 
scope its autonomous powers. The United Kingdom’s consistent support for extensive devolution 
of powers to Scotland has been taken entirely apart from any EU involvement. 
The results of the present study have important policy implications. It has been 
hypothesized that under the EU’s system of three-tier federalism, national competences that have 
been transferred to the European level are weakening the importance of the nation state. If this 
proposition is true, it would be expected that activities within the EU institutions on behalf of a 
regional autonomy will correlate with more favorable decisions by the national government on 
behalf of granting increased economy. Likewise, it would be expected that a failure of a region to 
seek to influence EU institutions on behalf of its autonomy would correlate with a more resistant 
attitude on the part of the nation state toward greater autonomy, as there then would be no 
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outside European pressures to drive the national government to attempt to resolve autonomy 
disputes.  
The present study gives no support to these expectations and in fact indicates the 
opposite, namely, that the position of the nation states towards an expansion of regional 
autonomy is the sole determining factor for whether the regional autonomy increases. This shows 
a deficiency in the effectiveness of the EU’s three-tier system as it currently functions that can 
have serious negative repercussions. Autonomy movements have attained significance 
throughout Europe and, as in Catalonia, have the potential to develop into situations of 
confrontation and even violence. The EU’s current failure to successfully address autonomy 
issues within member nations thus demonstrates fundamental weakness in an important area of 
governance that is an important part of  “creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe” as stated in Article 1 TEU.  
Four regions have been examined here where issues relating to autonomy have gained 
widespread attention in Europe and beyond. To strengthen confidence in the results found in this 
study, the scope of the study could be expanded to include many more of the regions of Europe 
that are seeking expanded autonomy from their nation states. The way autonomy is defined in the 
present study encompasses every level of devolution of national powers. Regions whose 
legislative councils have very limited legislative authority and fiscal ability fall within the 
category of autonomous region, as do regions that are on the threshold of national independence. 
Any increase in even the most limited autonomy, for example, a slight expansion of the very 
limited self-governing powers of a regional council, fall within this definition. The definition of 
autonomy used here could thus be used to examine all of the diverse autonomies of Europe using 
the same typology applied in the present study.  
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It is predicted that such further studies will yield similar results to those arrived at here as 
long as the leadership of the EU continues to view the EU as a treaty of nation states rather than 
a government of European citizens. As long as such a viewpoint persists, the EU will not deem it 
appropriate to intervene in the internal affairs of a nation state on behalf of a region’s autonomy 
efforts. Paradiplomatic efforts by regions within EU institutions will be countered by an attitude 
among top EU officials that questions of regional autonomy should be left strictly within the 
domain of nation states.  
In particular, the statements of EU officials in absolute opposition to the Catalonian 
independence referendum indicate that these officials still consider the EU as a treaty of nations, 
with the EU always supporting the positions of national governments and lacking authority to 
alter regional relations within each sovereign nation state. Under this concept of the EU, the EU 
cannot be expected to become deeply involved in contested autonomy issues, and the 
paradiplomatic efforts of regions within the EU can be expected to have little influence on the 
decisions of the national governments to grant or withhold greater autonomy. 
The results of the present study offer many possibilities for additional research. The 
analysis of the four autonomies examined in this thesis can be extended into later time frames to 
see if the conclusions reached here remain valid. Concerning a region’s paradiplomatic activities 
within the EU, the detail of analysis could be increased by focusing on regional diplomacy 
within particular EU institutions, for example, the Committee of the Regions or committees of 
the European Parliament.  
The specific actions of regional delegations within the different political parties of 
European Parliament could also be considered. This type of analysis would be particularly 
valuable in situations where EU activity is shown to influence national policy. Based on these 
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results of research studies that show which particular types of EU activities are effective in this 
regard, regional paradiplomatic delegations could focus their efforts on promoting these 
activities. Additional empirical guidance for specific policy choices could be provided by 
quantitative studies, as described in the methodology section above, that used as variables 
selected aspects of the actions of nation states and of EU activities.  
The methodology used in the present study could actually be used to test whether the 
concept of a Europe of citizens is strengthening within the EU. If the EU evolves into a truly 
effective three-tier system where national and regional interests are given equal consideration, 
then the concept of a Europe of citizens would stand on a much firmer footing. Regions could 
make the argument that the democratic choice of European citizens should include the ability of 
regional citizens to vote to strengthen their autonomies. Should the EU evolve in such a manner, 
it can be expected that future studies on this topic will show that activities within the EU can 
influence the policies of national governments towards the scope of their autonomies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION 
The present thesis is an effort to use empirical evidence to determine the relative 
importance of national governments and the EU in influencing changes in regional autonomies. 
It provides an initial empirical answer to the question of whether the actions of nation states or of 
the EU are key to determining whether a region seeking greater autonomy will succeed in its 
goals. Throughout history, issues of autonomy were decided entirely between nation states and 
their component regions. But the transfer of extensive governmental competences from the 
national to the European level particularly since the time of the Lisbon Treaty, and the 
emergence of a three-tiered system of federalism that includes the EU and its member nation 
states as well as subnational entities, raises the possibility that the EU’s supranational institutions 
can play a constructive role in resolving regional autonomy disputes.  This possibility has been 
explored empirically in the present study using a qualitative analysis that compared four regional 
autonomy movements.  
A theoretical hurdle in this analysis was to develop a definition of autonomy that was 
readily measurable and provided an accurate indicator of changes in a region’s autonomous 
status. There are a vast range of governmental competences that can be considered in making 
evaluations of the levels of regional autonomies, but the common thread in all of them is that 
they are dependent for their exercise on the possession of budgetary control. With this insight in 
mind, two definitions of primary importance to the present analysis have been developed, those 
of “independent fiscal ability” and “real autonomy.” “Independent fiscal ability” is defined 
deemed as the capacity of a regional government to implement a governmental program that it 
has enacted into law, achieved either through its regional taxing authority, automatic transfers of 
funds from the national government, or a combination of these two. “Real autonomy” has been 
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defined as the possession of independent fiscal ability. Increases in independent fiscal ability 
translate into increases in real autonomy. Using these terms, changes in autonomy can be 
measured and compared across regions. Furthermore, this measurement of real autonomy 
encompasses all levels of autonomy, from strictly limited powers within a regional governing 
council to complete separation from a nation state, and thus can be applied not only to the four 
case studies presented here but also generally to all autonomy movements within the EU. 
To determine the respective impacts of national governments and the EU in determining 
the success of regional autonomy movements, two alternative hypotheses have been developed. 
Under the first hypothesis, increases in the real autonomy of a region are dependent on actions of 
the national government. Under the second alternative hypothesis, increases in a region’s real 
autonomy are dependent on activity within the EU, a term that has been defined to include both a 
region’s own activities to promote its autonomy within EU institutions and the actions of the EU 
institutions themselves in support of greater autonomy for the region.  
To test these alternative hypotheses, four case studies have been undertaken. Together, 
these case studies cover every possible situation under the above two hypothesis. In the first 
situation, exemplified by Åland, the national government has opposed greater autonomy and 
there has been no activity within the EU on behalf of that autonomy. In the second situation, 
exemplified by Catalonia, the national government has also opposed greater autonomy but there 
has been activity within the EU on behalf of that autonomy. In the third situation, exemplified by 
Scotland, the national government has supported greater autonomy but there has been no activity 
within the EU in support of greater autonomy. Finally, in the fourth situation, exemplified by 
Flanders, the national government supported greater autonomy and there has been activity within 
the EU in support of an increase in autonomy. 
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In all four of the case studies, it has been found that the actions of the national 
government have been the sole determining factor whether a region achieves increased real 
autonomy, and that the actions of a region to promote its autonomy within EU institutions have 
not influenced the outcome. The opposition of the national government of Finland toward greater 
autonomy for Åland, and the opposition of the national Spanish government towards greater 
Catalonian autonomy have coincided with a failure of both these regions to increase the level of 
their real autonomy since the time of the Lisbon Treaty. The end result has been the same in both 
regions even though Åland has not promoted its desire for greater autonomy within the EU and 
Catalonia is diligently working within EU institutions to gain European support of its bid for 
national separation.  
Likewise, the support of the government of the United Kingdom for greater Scottish 
autonomy and that of the Belgian government for enhanced Flemish autonomy has coincided 
with increased real autonomy for both of these regions. Very high levels of autonomy have been 
achieved in both regions despite their contrasting positions within the EU, as the Scottish 
government has not promoted its autonomy within the EU and the government of Flanders 
considers its EU representation to be an integral part of the ongoing process of the devolution of 
its regional powers from the Belgian state.  
The use of historical evidence from a broad range of governmental sources increases 
confidence in the consistency and strength of its conclusions. The methodology used in this 
study could be applied to other autonomous movements throughout Europe. These additional 
studies would serve to confirm or refute the present results. Future research also could apply a 
more detailed, quantitative approach by selecting specific indicators of independent fiscal 
activity within specific areas of governance and of specific types of activity within EU 
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institutions that can be numerically compared. These more detailed quantitative studies could 
potentially provide predictive models of the effects of specific policy choices by national and 
regional governments as well as EU institutions..  
Ultimately, the results of the present research study, and of future studies that it inspires, 
tie back to fundamental issues about the nature of the EU. If the EU’s leadership continues to 
view the EU as merely a union of states possessing only those powers specifically granted by 
treaty, then national governments will continue to have control over the success or failure of 
regional autonomy movements. This is so because the EU will not consider it a proper role to 
intervene in internal national affairs. If, however, the EU begins to be perceived as a union based 
on a common European citizenship, regional interests will be increasingly viewed as coming 
within its jurisdiction. With citizenship as the basis of the EU, the interests of nations will no 
longer automatically be considered to have precedence over those of regions. A true three-tier 
system will emerge in which the EU will play a key role in balancing the interests of nations, 
regions and individual citizens. Research studies such as the present one, which evaluate the 
comparative roles of nation states and the EU in affecting the course of autonomy movements, 
can be used as indicators of whether such an evolution in the basic conception of the EU is 
taking place.   
Recent developments in Catalonia are a warning that issues of autonomy have the 
potential to lead to violence when a national government refuses to devolve its powers against 
the will of the people of a region. As long as decisions as to the extent of autonomy rest entirely 
with the nation states, this possibility of violence will persist. Only a genuinely three-tiered EU 
governance, founded on the rights of its citizens and accepting a principle of regional self-
determination, can guarantee that Europe will not violently break up along its regional lines. 
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